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Abstract
In the field of non-monotonic logics, the notion of Rational Closure (RC) is acknowledged as a
prominent approach. In recent years, RC has gained even more popularity in the context of Description
Logics (DLs), the logic underpinning the semantic web standard ontology language OWL 2, whose
main ingredients are classes and roles.
In this work, we show how to integrate RC within the triple language RDFS, which together with
OWL 2 are the two major standard semantic web ontology languages. To do so, we start from ρdf,
which is the logic behind RDFS, and then extend it to ρdf⊥, allowing to state that two entities are
incompatible. Eventually, we propose defeasible ρdf⊥ via a typical RC construction.
The main features of our approach are: (i) unlike most other approaches that add an extra non-
monotone rule layer on top of monotone RDFS, defeasible ρdf⊥ remains syntactically a triple language
and is a simple extension of ρdf by introducing some new predicate symbols with specific semantics.
In particular, any RDFS reasoner/store may handle them as ordinary terms if it does not want to take
account for the extra semantics of the new predicate symbols; (ii) the defeasible ρdf⊥ entailment deci-
sion procedure is build on top of the ρdf⊥ entailment decision procedure, which in turn is an extension
of the one for ρdf via some additional inference rules favouring an potential implementation; and (iii)
defeasible ρdf⊥ entailment can be decided in polynomial time.
1 Introduction
Description Logics [13] (DLs) under Rational Closure [58] (RC) is a well-known framework for non-
monotonic reasoning in DLs, which has gained rising attention in the last decade (see, e.g., [22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 29, 27, 30, 38, 40, 41, 42, 46, 45, 43, 44, 47, 20, 74, 70, 69, 71] for related approaches).
We recall that a typical problem that can be addressed using non-monotonic formalisms is reasoning
with ontologies in which some classes are exceptional w.r.t. some properties of their super classes, as
illustrated with the well-known “penguin example”.
Example 1.1. We know that penguins are birds, birds usually fly, while penguins do not. ✷
While DLs provide the logical foundation of formal ontologies of the OWL family [66] and endowing
them with non-monotonic features is still a main issue, as documented by the past 20 years of technical
development (see e.g., [19, 35, 34, 39, 62] and references therein), addressing non-monotonicity in the
context of the triple language RDFS [76], which together with OWL 2 are the two major standard semantic
web ontology languages, has attracted in comparison little attention so far. Almost all approaches we are
aware of consider a so-called rule-layer on top of RDFS (see e.g., [7, 8, 36, 35, 53] and Section 4).
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In this paper, we will show how to integrate RC within the triple language RDFS. To to do so, we
start from ρdf [63], which is the logic behind RDFS, and then extend it to ρdf⊥, allowing to state that
two entities are incompatible. So, for instance, by referring to Example 1.1, we may represent that flying
creatures (f ) and non-flying creatures (e) are incompatible each other via the ρdf⊥ triple (e,⊥c, f) (see
also Example 3.1 later on), where ⊥c is a new predicate added to the ρdf vocabulary to model an incom-
patibility relation. Based on ρdf⊥, we will then propose defeasible ρdf⊥ via a typical RC construction,
allowing to state, e.g., “birds (b) usually fly” via the defeasible triple 〈b, sc, f〉, alongside classical triples
such as (p, sc, b) (“penguins (p) are birds”) and (p, sc, e) (“penguins are non-flying creatures”).1 To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to include RC within RDFS.
The main features of our approach are:
• unlike other approaches that add an extra non-monotone rule layer on top of monotone RDFS, de-
feasible ρdf⊥ remains syntactically a triple language and is a simple extension of ρdf by introducing
some new predicate symbols with specific semantics. In particular, any RDFS reasoner/store and
SPARQL [50] query answering tool may handle them as ordinary terms if it does not want to take
account for the extra semantics of the new predicate symbols added to ρdf;
• the defeasible ρdf⊥ entailment decision procedure is build on top of the ρdf⊥ entailment decision
procedure, which in turn is an extension of the one for ρdf via some additional inference rules
favouring an potential implementation; and
• defeasible ρdf⊥ entailment can be decided in polynomial time.
In the following, we will proceed as follows. In the next section, we will introduce ρdf⊥, by defining its
syntax, semantics and entailment decision procedure. In Section 3 we extend ρdf⊥ towards defeasible
ρdf⊥ via a RC construction, defining syntax, semantics, entailment decision procedure and address its
computational complexity. Section 4 concludes, summarises related work and highlights future work.
2 ρdf⊥ graphs
RC is one of the most popular non-monotonic approaches in conditional reasoning. Unlike other ap-
proaches to non-monotonic reasoning for RDFS (see Section 4), that are build using some form of nega-
tion as failure, conditional reasoning systems are usually based on a different technical solution: given a
set of defeasible conditionals α  β (if α holds, then presumably β holds), we use them like classical
monotonic conditionals until we have a conflict in our information, that triggers the non-monotonic rea-
soning machinery. Example 1.1 is a classical example: we have a conflict between classical reasoning,
suggesting that penguins, being birds, should fly, and exceptional more specific information, stating that
penguins do not fly. Faced with such a conflict, the non-monotonic engine solves it giving, in this case,
precedence to the more specific information (penguins do not fly). This kind of reasoning allows a good
level of flexibility: we can freely add in our premises exceptional cases that are in conflict with the general
rules (that is, the conditionals), and the non-monotonic machinery will be able to autonomously manage
such conflicts. However, in order to implement this kind of defeasible reasoning in the RDFS framework,
we need to introduce some notion of informational incompatibility. In the following, we extend the ρdf
language to the ρdf⊥ language allowing to express some form of conflicts.
1According to ρdf, sc stands for “is subclass of”.
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2.1 Syntax
We rely on a fragment of RDFS, called minimal ρdf [63, Def. 15], that covers essential features of RDFS.
Specifically, minimal ρdf is defined as the following subset of the RDFS vocabulary:
ρdf = {sp, sc, type, dom, range} .
Moreover, it does not consider so-called blank nodes and, thus, in what follows, triples and graphs will
be ground. In fact, minimal ρdf suffices to illustrate the main concepts and algorithms we will consider
in this work and ease the presentation. To avoid unnecessary redundancy, we will just drop the term
‘minimal’ in what follows.
So, consider pairwise disjoint alphabetsU and L denoting, respectively,URI references and literals.2
We assume that U contains the ρdf vocabulary. A literal may be a plain literal (e.g., a string) or a typed
literal (e.g., a boolean value) [61]. We call the elements inUL terms. Terms are denoted with lower case
letters a, b, . . . with optional super/lower script.
A triple is of the form τ = (s, p, o) ∈ UL×U×UL,3 where s, o /∈ ρdf. We call s the subject, p the
predicate, and o the object.
A graphG is a set of triples, the universe of G, denoted uni(G), is the set of terms inUL that occur
in the triples of G.
We recall that informally (i) (p, sp, q) means that property p is a subproperty of property q; (ii)
(c, sc, d) means that class c is a subclass of class d; (iii) (a, type, b) means that a is of type b; (iv)
(p, dom, c)means that the domain of property p is c; and (v) (p, range, c)means that the range of property
p is c.
We extend the vocabulary of ρdf with a new pair of predicates,⊥c and ⊥p, representing incompatible
information: (vi) (c,⊥c, d) indicates that the classes c and d are disjoint and, analogously, (vii) (p,⊥p, q)
indicates that the properties p and q are disjoint.
We call ρdf⊥ the vocabulary obtained from ρdf by adding ⊥c and ⊥p, that is,
ρdf⊥ = {sp, sc, type, dom, range,⊥c,⊥p} .
Like for ρdf, we assume thatU contains the ρdf⊥ vocabulary and that all triples (s, p, o) ∈ UL×U×UL
are such that s, o /∈ ρdf⊥.
Remark 2.1. Please, note that we allow the ρdf⊥ predicates to occur only as second elements of the
triples, that is, we allow triples (p, sp, q), but not triples such as e.g., (sp, p, o) or (⊥p, p, o), which is in
line with the notion of minimal ρdf triple [63, Def. 15].
2.2 Semantics
An interpretation I over a vocabulary V is a tuple I = 〈∆R,∆P,∆C,∆L,P[[·]],C[[·]], ·I〉, where∆R,∆P,
∆C,∆L are the interpretation domains of I, which are finite non-empty sets, and P[[·]],C[[·]], ·
I are the
interpretation functions of I. In particular:
1. ∆R are the resources (the domain or universe of I);
2. ∆P are property names (not necessarily disjoint from∆R);
3. ∆C ⊆ ∆R are the classes;
4. ∆L ⊆ ∆R are the literal values and contains L ∩ V ;
2We assumeU, and L fixed, and for ease we will denote unions of these sets simply concatenating their names.
3As in [63] we allow literals for s.
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5. P[[·]] is a functionP[[·]] : ∆P → 2∆R×∆R ;
6. C[[·]] is a function C[[·]] : ∆C → 2∆R ;
7. ·I maps each t ∈ UL ∩ V into a value tI ∈ ∆R ∪ ∆P, and such that ·I is the identity for plain
literals and assigns an element in ∆R to each element in L.
Definition 2.1 (Satisfaction). An interpretation I is a model of a graph G, denoted I ρdf⊥ G, if and
only if I is an interpretation over the vocabulary ρdf⊥ ∪ uni(G) that satisfies the following conditions:
Simple:
1. for each (s, p, o) ∈ G, pI ∈ ∆P and (sI , oI) ∈ P[[pI ]];
Subproperty:
1. P[[spI ]] is transitive over∆P;
2. if (p, q) ∈ P[[spI ]] then p, q ∈ ∆P andP[[p]] ⊆ P[[q]];
Subclass:
1. P[[scI ]] is transitive over∆C;
2. if (c, d) ∈ P[[scI ]] then c, d ∈ ∆C and C[[c]] ⊆ C[[d]];
Typing I:
1. x ∈ C[[c]] if and only if (x, c) ∈ P[[typeI ]];
2. if (p, c) ∈ P[[domI ]] and (x, y) ∈ P[[p]] then x ∈ C[[c]];
3. if (p, c) ∈ P[[rangeI ]] and (x, y) ∈ P[[p]] then y ∈ C[[c]];
Typing II:
1. For each e ∈ ρdf⊥, e
I ∈ ∆P
2. if (p, c) ∈ P[[domI ]] then p ∈ ∆P and c ∈ ∆C
3. if (p, c) ∈ P[[rangeI ]] then p ∈ ∆P and c ∈ ∆C
4. if (x, c) ∈ P[[typeI ]] then c ∈ ∆C
Disjointness I:
1. if (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]] then c, d ∈ ∆C;
2. P[[⊥c
I ]] is symmetric, sc-transitive and c-exhaustive over ∆C (see below);
3. if (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]] then p, q ∈ ∆P;
4. P[[⊥p
I ]] is symmetric, sp-transitive and p-exhaustive over∆P (see below);
Disjointness II:
1. If (p, c) ∈ P[[domI ]], (q, d) ∈ P[[domI ]], and (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]], then (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]];
2. If (p, c) ∈ P[[rangeI ]], (q, d) ∈ P[[rangeI ]], and (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]], then (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]].
Symmetry:
1. If (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]], then (d, c) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]]
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2. If (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]], then (q, p) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]]
sc-Transitivity:
1. If (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]] and (e, c) ∈ P[[scI ]], then (e, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]]
sp-Transitivity:
1. If (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]] and (r, p) ∈ P[[spI ]], then (r, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]]
c-Exhaustive:
1. If (c, c) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]] and d ∈ ∆C then (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]];
p-Exhaustive:
1. If (p, p) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]] and q ∈ ∆P then (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]] .
A graphG is satisfiable if it has a model I (denoted I ρdf⊥ G).
Remark 2.2. Please note that we have built our semantics starting from the so-called reflexive-relaxed
ρdf semantics [63], in which the predicates sc and sp are not assumed to be reflexive in accordance to the
notion of minimal graph [63, Def. 15]. Our additional semantic constraints w.r.t. [63, Def. 15] are those
of condition Disjointness I onwards.
Remark 2.3. Note that the presence of e.g., (a, type, b), (a, type, c) and (b,⊥c, c) in a graph does not
preclude its satisfiability. In fact, a graph is always satisfiable (see Corollary 2.5 later on) avoiding,
thus, the possibility of unsatisfiability and the ex falso quodlibet principle, which is in line with the ρdf
semantics [64, 63].
On top of the notion of satisfaction we define a notion of entailment between graphs.
Definition 2.2 (Entailmentρdf⊥). Given two graphsG andH , we say thatG entailsH , denotedG ρdf⊥
H , if and only if every model of G is also a model ofH .
2.3 Deductive system
In what follows, we provide a sound and complete deductive system for our language. Our system extends
the classical minimal ρdf system as by [63, Proposition 17]. The system is arranged in groups of rules
that capture the semantic conditions of models. In every rule,A,B,C,D,E,X , and Y are meta-variables
representing elements inUL. An instantiation of a rule is obtained by replacing those meta-variables with
actual terms.
The rules are as follows:
1. Simple:
G
G′
for G′ ⊆ G
2. Subproperty:
(a) (A,sp,B),(B,sp,C)(A,sp,C) (b)
(D,sp,E),(X,D,Y )
(X,E,Y )
3. Subclass:
(a) (A,sc,B),(B,sc,C)(A,sc,C) (b)
(A,sc,B),(X,type,A)
(X,type,B)
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4. Typing:
(a) (D,dom,B),(X,D,Y )(X,type,B) (b)
(D,range,B),(X,D,Y )
(Y,type,B)
5. Conceptual Disjointness:
(a) (A,⊥c,B)(B,⊥c,A) (b)
(A,⊥c,B),(C,sc,A)
(C,⊥c,B)
(c) (A,⊥c,A)(A,⊥c,B)
6. Predicate Disjointness:
(a)
(A,⊥p,B)
(B,⊥p,A)
(b)
(A,⊥p,B),(C,sp,A)
(C,⊥p,B)
(c)
(A,⊥p,A)
(A,⊥p,B)
7. Crossed Disjointness:
(a) (A,dom,C),(B,dom,D),(C,⊥c,D)(A,⊥p,B) (b)
(A,range,C),(B,range,D),(C,⊥c,D)
(A,⊥p,B)
Please note that the rules that extend minimal ρdf to ρdf⊥ are rules (5) - (7).
Now, using this rules we define a derivation relation in a similar way as in [63, 64].
Definition 2.3 (Derivation ⊢ρdf⊥). Let G and H be ρdf⊥-graphs. G ⊢ρdf⊥ H iff there exists a sequence
of graphs P1, P2, . . . , Pk with P1 = G and Pk = H and for each j (2 6 j 6 k) one of the following
cases hold:
• Pj ⊆ Pj−1 (rule (1));
• there is an instantiationR/R′ of one of the rules (2)-(7), such thatR ⊆ Pj−1 and Pj = Pj−1∪R′.
Such sequence of graphs is called a proof of G ⊢ρdf⊥ H . Whenever G ⊢ρdf⊥ H , we say that the graph
H is derived from the graph G. Each pair (Pj−1, Pj), 1 6 j 6 k is called a step of the proof which is
labeled by the respective instantiationR/R′ of the rule applied at the step.
We are going now to prove the following soundness and completeness theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Soundness & Completeness). Let G andH be ρdf⊥-graphs.
G ⊢ρdf⊥ H iff G ρdf⊥ H .
We divide the proof into lemmas. The following one is needed for soundness.
Lemma 2.2. Let G and H be ρdf⊥-graphs, let G be satisfiable, and let one of the following statements
hold:
• H ⊆ G;
• there is an instantiationR/R′ of one of the rules (2)-(7), such that R ⊆ G andH = G ∪R′.
Then, G ρdf⊥ H .
Proof. G is satisfiable, hence let I = 〈∆R,∆P,∆C,∆L,P[[·]],C[[·]], ·I〉 be a model of G (I ρdf⊥ G)
for some assignment A. That is, I satisfies all the conditions in Definition 2.1. We have to prove that
G ρdf⊥ H , that is, I ρdf⊥ H .
We consider only the rules (5)-(7). The theorem has already been proved for groups of rules (1)-(4)
in [63, Lemma 31].4
4In [63, Lemma 31] the authors consider a stronger system in which the predicates sc and sp are reflexive. We drop such
properties, hence dropping the corresponding groups (6) and (7) of derivation rules in [63, Table 1]. Hence we need to follow the
proof of Lemma 31 in [63] only until the point (4) included.
6
Rule (5a). Let (c,⊥c, d) ∈ R for some R ⊆ G, R′ = R ∪ {(d,⊥c, a)}, obtained via the application
of rule (5a), and H = G ∪ R′. We have that for every model I of G, I ρdf⊥ R, since R ⊆ G.
Therefore, I satisfies (c,⊥c, d), and, since it is a model ofG and is symmetric on⊥c (see Definition
2.1), we have that (dI , cI) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]]. That is, I satisfies (d,⊥c, c). Hence, from I ρdf⊥ R
′ and
I ρdf⊥ G, I ρdf⊥ H follows.
Rule (5b). Let (c,⊥c, d) and (e, sc, c) be in R, for some R ⊆ G. Consider R′ = R ∪ {(e,⊥c, d)},
obtained via the application of rule (5b), and H = G ∪ R′. We have that for every model I of
G, I ρdf⊥ R, since R ⊆ G. I satisfies (c,⊥c, d) and (e, sc, c), and, since it is a model of G,
by sc-transitivity of I, (eI , dI) ∈ P[[⊥p
I ]] follows. That is, I satisfies (e,⊥c, d). Hence, since
I ρdf⊥ R
′ and I ρdf⊥ G, we have that I ρdf⊥ H .
Rule (5c). Let (c,⊥c, c) ∈ R for someR ⊆ G,R′ = R∪{(c,⊥c, d)}, obtained via the application of rule
(5c), andH = G∪R′. We have that for every model I ofG, I ρdf⊥ R, since R ⊆ G. Therefore,
I satisfies (c,⊥c, c), and, since it is a model of G and is c-exhaustive on ⊥c (see Definition 2.1),
we have that (cI , dI) ∈ P[[⊥c
I ]]. That is, I satisfies (c,⊥c, d). Hence, from I ρdf⊥ R
′ and
I ρdf⊥ G, I ρdf⊥ H follows.
Rules (6a), (6b) and (6c). The argument is analogous to rules (5a), (5b) and (5c)
Rule (7a). Let (p, dom, c), (q, dom, d), and (c,⊥c, d) be in R for some R ⊆ G, R′ = R ∪ {(p,⊥p, q)},
obtained via the application of rule (7a), andH = G ∪ R′. We have that for every model I of G,
I ρdf⊥ R, since R ⊆ G. I satisfies (p, dom, c), (q, dom, d), and (c,⊥c, d), that by condition 1 of
Disjointness II implies I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q).
Rule (7b). As for rule (7a), just by referring to condition 2 of Disjointness II instead of condition 1 of
Disjointness II.
✷
The following lemma defines the construction of the canonical model for ρdf⊥ graphs. Let Cl(G) be the
closure of G under the application of rules (2)− (7).
Lemma 2.3. Given a ρdf⊥-graphG, define an interpretation IG as a tuple
IG = 〈∆R,∆P,∆C,∆L,P[[·]],C[[·]], ·
IG〉
such that:
1. ∆R := uni(G) ∪ ρdf⊥;
2. ∆P := {p ∈ uni(G) | (s, p, o) ∈ Cl(G)} ∪ ρdf⊥ ∪ {p ∈ uni(G) | either (p, sp, q), (q, sp, p),
(p, dom, c), (p, range, d), (p,⊥p, q) or (q,⊥p, p) ∈ Cl(G)};
3. ∆C := {c ∈ uni(G) | (x, type, c) ∈ Cl(G)}∪{c ∈ uni(G) | either (c, sc, d), (d, sc, c), (p, dom, c),
(p, range, c), (c,⊥c, d) or (d,⊥c, c) ∈ Cl(G)};
4. ∆L := uni(G) ∩ L;
5. P[[·]] is an extension functionP[[·]] : ∆P → 2∆R×∆R s.t. P[[p]] := {(s, o) | (s, p, o) ∈ Cl(G)};
6. C[[·]] is an extension function C[[·]] : ∆C → 2∆R s.t. C[[c]] := {x ∈ uni(G) | (x, type, c) ∈ Cl(G)};
7. ·IG is an identity function over ∆R.
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Then, for every ρdf⊥-graphG, IG ρdf⊥ G.
Proof. We need to prove that IG satisfies the constraints in Definition 2.1. At first, note that for the
conditions Simple to Typing II, the proof corresponds to the proof of Lemma 32 in [63]5. So, let us
verify the remaining conditions.
Disjointness I:
1. If (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]], then c, d ∈ ∆C. This holds by construction of∆C.
2. P[[⊥c
IG ]] is symmetric, sc-transitive and c-exhaustive over∆C.
Symmetry: Let (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]] = P[[⊥c]]. By construction of IG we have that (c,⊥c, d) ∈
Cl(G), and we also have that c, d ∈ ∆C. Due to the closure under rule (5a), (d,⊥c, c) ∈
Cl(G), and by construction ofP[[·]], (d, c) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]].
sc-transitivity: Let (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]] = P[[⊥c]] and (e, c) ∈ P[[scIG ]] = P[[sc]]. By con-
struction of IG we have that (c,⊥c, d), (e, sc, c) ∈ Cl(G), and we also have that c, d, e ∈ ∆C.
Due to the closure under rule (5b), (e,⊥c, d) ∈ Cl(G), and by construction of P[[·]], (e, d) ∈
P[[⊥c
IG ]].
c-exhaustive: Let (c, c) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]] = P[[⊥c]]. By construction of IG we have that (c,⊥c, c) ∈
Cl(G) and c ∈ ∆C. Due to the closure under rule (5c), (c,⊥c, d) ∈ Cl(G), and by construc-
tion ofP[[·]], (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]] with d ∈ ∆C.
3. If (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
IG ]], then p, q ∈ ∆P. This holds by construction of∆P.
4. P[[⊥p
IG ]] is symmetric, sp-transitive and p-exhaustive over ∆P. The proof is a rephrasing of the
proof of point 2.
Disjointness II:
1. If (p, c) ∈ P[[domIG ]], (q, d) ∈ P[[domIG ]], and (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]], then (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
IG ]].
Indeed, let (p, c) ∈ P[[domIG ]], (q, d) ∈ P[[domIG ]], and (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]]. By construction
ofP[[·]], (p, dom, c), (q, dom, d), and (c,⊥c, d) are in Cl(G). Moreover,Cl(G) is closed under
rule (7a) and, thus, (p,⊥p, q) ∈ Cl(G), and, by construction ofP[[·]], (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
IG ]].
2. If (p, c) ∈ P[[rangeIG ]], (q, d) ∈ P[[rangeIG ]], and (c, d) ∈ P[[⊥c
IG ]], then (p, q) ∈ P[[⊥p
IG ]].
The proof is analogous to the previous point: we just need to refer to range and rule (7b)
instead of dom and rule (7a), which concludes.
✷
Eventually, we have:
Lemma 2.4. Let G andH be ρdf⊥-graphs. If G ρdf⊥ H thenH ⊆ Cl(G).
Proof. The proof mirrors the proof of Lemma 33 in [63]. In particular, consider the interpretation
IG = 〈∆R,∆P,∆C,∆L,P[[·]],C[[·]], ·
IG〉
as defined in Lemma 2.3. Therefore, as both IG ρdf⊥ G and G ρdf⊥ H hold, we have IG ρdf⊥ H
by Definition 2.2. Therefore, for each (s, p, o) ∈ H , pIG ∈ ∆P and (sIG , oIG) ∈ P[[pIG ]]. More-
over, by construction pIG = p, and P[[pIG ]] = P[[p]] = {(s, o) | (s, p, o) ∈ Cl(G)}. Finally, since
(sIG , oIG) ∈ P[[pIG ]], we have that (sIG , pIG , oIG)) ∈ Cl(G), i.e., (s, p, o) ∈ Cl(G), for each (s, p, o) ∈
H . Therefore,H ⊆ Cl(G), which concludes. ✷
5With the minor difference that in [63, Lemma32] the authors impose also reflexivity to the interpretations of the predicates sc
and sp and consider the associated derivation rules, while here we do not.
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Eventually, we can prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The proof mirrors the proof of Theorem 8 in [63]. From Lemma 2.4, G ρdf⊥ H
implies that H can be obtained from Cl(G) using rule (1). Thus, since G ⊢ρdf⊥ Cl(G), it follows that
G ⊢ρdf⊥ H . Therefore Theorem 2.1 follows from Lemmas 2.2 and 2.4. ✷
Please note that, like in classical ρdf, ρdf⊥-graphs are always satisfiable.
Corollary 2.5. A ρdf⊥-graphG is always satisfiable.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.3. ✷
2.4 Some interesting derived inference rules
In what follows, we illustrate the derivation of some interesting rules of inference. To start with, note
that the triples (d,⊥c, d) and (q,⊥p, q) are particularly significant: indeed, the intended meaning of
e.g., (d,⊥c, d) is that ‘concept/class d is empty’.
Some derived inference rules that will turn out to be useful are the following:
Empty Subclass:
(A, sc, B) (A, sc, C) (B,⊥c, C)
(EmptySC)
(A,⊥c, A)
Here is the derivation:
(A, sc, B) (B,⊥c, C)
(5b)
(A,⊥c, C)
(5a)
(C,⊥c, A) (A, sc, C)
(5b)
(A,⊥c, A)
A special case of rule (EmptySC) is obtained by imposing B = C, shows that if a class is empty,
also all its subclasses are empty.
(A, sc, B) (B,⊥c, B)
(EmptySC’)
(A,⊥c, A)
Empty Subpredicate:
(A, sp, B) (A, sp, C) (B,⊥p, C)
(EmptySP)
(A,⊥p, A)
Here is the derivation:
(A, sp, B) (B,⊥p, C)
(6b)
(A,⊥p, C)
(6a)
(C,⊥p, A) (A, sp, C)
(6b)
(A,⊥p, A)
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As for (EmptySC), by imposing B = C we obtain a special case of the rule (EmptySP) showing
that if a property is empty, so are all its subproperties.
(A, sc, B) (B,⊥p, B)
(EmptySP’)
(A,⊥p, A)
Conflicting Domain:
(A, dom, C) (A, dom, X) (C,⊥c, X)
(7a’)
(A,⊥p, A)
This is a special case of the rule (7a) in which B = A.
Conflicting Range:
(A, range, C) (A, range, X) (C,⊥c, X)
(7b’)
(A,⊥p, A)
Similarly as above, this is a special case of the rule (7b) in which B = A.
3 Defeasible ρdf⊥
We now introduce the possibility of modelling defeasible information in the RDFS framework. A frame-
work without any notion of potential conflict between different pieces of information would have not
allowed to model presumptive reasoning, that is, the kind of uncertain reasoning in which we proceed
assuming that what we consider as typically true holds whenever it is not in conflict with the other infor-
mation at our disposal.
3.1 Syntax
We will consider defeasibility only w.r.t. the predicates sc and sp only and introduce the notion of defea-
sible triple defined next.
Definition 3.1 (Defeasible triple). A defeasible triple is of the form
δ = 〈s, p, o〉 ∈ UL× {sc, sp} ×UL ,
where s, o 6∈ ρdf⊥.
The intended meaning of e.g., 〈c, sc, d〉 is “Typically, an instance of c is also an instance of b”. For
example, if b is interpreted as the class of birds and f as the class of flying creatures, 〈b, sc, f〉 represents
the defeasible statement “Typically, birds fly”. Analogously, 〈p, sp, q〉 is read as “Typically, a pair related
by p is also related by q”. For example, if p represents the predicate being the parent of and b the predicate
being blood-related to, the triple 〈p, sp, b〉 represents the defeasible statement “Generally, the parents are
blood-related to their children”.
In the following, we use the notation J·, ·, ·K to indicate either (·, ·, ·) or 〈·, ·, ·〉 (that is, J·, ·, ·K ∈
{(·, ·, ·), 〈·, ·, ·〉}).
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Remark 3.1. Note that in practice a triple 〈c, sc, d〉 may be represented as (c, sct, d), where sct is a new
symbol indicating defeasible class inclusion. Similarly, 〈p, sp, q〉 may be represented as (p, spt, q), where
spt is a new symbol indicating defeasible property inclusion. Therefore, both defeasible triples could have
been represented in ρdf⊥ ∪ {sct, spt}. While certainly this is an option for a practical implementation,
for ease of presentation, we prefer to stick to the former notation.
A defeasible graph is a set G = Gstr ∪Gdef , whereGstr is a ρdf⊥-graph andGdef is a set of defeasible
triples. Given two defeasible graphsG and G′, G is a sub-graph of G′ iff G ⊆ G′.
Given a defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef , its strict counterpart is the graph
Gs := Gstr ∪ {(s, p, o) | 〈s, p, o〉 ∈ Gdef} . (1)
Generally speaking, given a defeasible graph G, we need to define how to reason with it. As mentioned
above, in presumptive reasoning it is considered rational to reason classically with defeasible information
in case no conflicts arise; on the other hand, if we have to deal with conflictual information we need to
refer to some form of defeasible reasoning to resolve such conflicts.
To do so, first of all, we need to define the notion of conflict in our framework.
Definition 3.2 (conflict). Let G be a defeasible graph. G has a conflict if, for some term t, either
Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) or G
s ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t) holds.
Informally, we consider that there is a conflict in a defeasible graph if, treating the defeasible triples as
classical triples, we have that some term t may be interpreted as being ‘empty’.6 To give a sense of
the rationale behind this definition, let’s see how it behaves w.r.t. the typical penguin example from the
non-monotonic reasoning literature.
Example 3.1 (Penguin example). Consider the following graph:
G = {(p, sc, b), 〈b, sc, f〉, (p, sc, e), (e,⊥c, f)} ,
where p, b, f, e stand for penguins, birds, flying creatures, non-flying creatures, respectively. As it is well-
known, the penguin example shows that exceptional subclasses cannot be appropriately be modelled with
classical reasoning, since, in the specific case, we would be forced to conclude that penguins can fly and
cannot fly at the same time, that is, penguins cannot exist. In our context, we have the following. The
strict counterpart of G is
Gs = {(p, sc, b), (b, sc, f), (p, sc, e), (e,⊥c, f)}
and from Gs we can indeed derive:
(p, sc, b) (b, sc, f)
(3a)
(p, sc, f) (p, sc, e) (e,⊥c, f)
(EmptySC)
(p,⊥c, p)
That is, reasoning with a strict ρdf⊥-graph penguins may be interpreted as ‘empty’.
6Note that the concept of conflict that we define here is related to the notion of incoherence in OWL formalism [75]: an OWL
ontology is incoherent if a concept introduced in the vocabulary turns out to be empty.
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3.2 Semantics
An interpretation for a defeasible graphs G is composed by a set of ρdf⊥ interpretations, ranked accord-
ingly to how much they conform to our expectations.
Definition 3.3 (Ranked ρdf⊥ Interpretations). A ranked interpretation is a pairR = (M , r), whereM is
the set of all ρdf⊥ interpretations defined on a fixed set of domains∆R,∆P ,∆C ,∆L, and r is a ranking
functions over M 7
r : M 7→ N ∪ {∞}
satisfying a convexity property:
• there is an interpretation I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0;
• for each i > 0, if there is an interpretation I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = i, then there is an interpretation
I ′ ∈ M s.t. r(I ′) = (i− 1).
Informally, the intuition behind ranking interpretations is that, given two interpretations I, I ′ ∈ M ,
r(I) < r(I ′) indicates that the interpretation I is more in line with our expectations than the interpreta-
tion I ′.
Now, givenR = (M , r), let MN be the set of elements in M with rank lower that∞, that is,
MN = {I ∈ M | r(I) ∈ N} .
Informally, in R the ρdf⊥-interpretations with rank infinite are simply considered impossible, and the
satisfaction relation, which we will define next is determined referring only to the ρdf⊥-interpretations
in MN. Given a ranked interpretation R = (M , r) and a term t, let c min(t,R) be the set of the most
expected interpretations in M in which t (interpreted as class) is not empty, that is,
c min(t,R) = {I ∈ MN | I 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) and there is no I
′ ∈ MN s.t.
I ′ 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) and r(I
′) < r(I)} .
Analogously, for a term t interpreted as predicate, we define
p min(t,R) = {I ∈ MN | I 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t) and there is no I
′ ∈ MN s.t.
I ′ 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t) and r(I
′) < r(I)} .
Definition 3.4 (Ranked satisfaction). For every triple (s, p, o), a ranked interpretation R = (M , r)
satisfies (s, p, o) if (s, p, o) is satisfied by every ρdf⊥-interpretation in M , that is,
R ρdf⊥ (s, p, o) iff I ρdf⊥ (s, p, o) for every I ∈ MN .
For every defeasible triple of the form 〈s, p, o〉, the notion of a ranked interpretation R = (M , r) satis-
fying 〈s, p, o〉, denotedR ρdf⊥ 〈s, p, o〉, is defined as follows:
R ρdf⊥ 〈c, sc, s〉 iff I ρdf⊥ (c, sc, d) for every I ∈ c min(c,R)
R ρdf⊥ 〈p, sp, q〉 iff I ρdf⊥ (p, sp, q) for every I ∈ p min(p,R) .
Given a defeasible ρdf⊥-graph G = G
str ∪ Gdef , a ranked interpretation R = (M , r) is a model of
G (denoted R ρdf⊥ G) if R ρdf⊥ (s, p, o) for every (s, p, o) ∈ G
str , and R ρdf⊥ 〈s, p, o〉 for every
〈s, p, o〉 ∈ Gdef .
7We will assume that 0 ∈ N.
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The intuition behind this definition is that the triple 〈c, sc, s〉 holds in a ranked interpretation if (c, sc, s)
holds in the most expected ρdf⊥-interpretations in which c is not an empty class. The intuition follows
the same line of the original propositional construction [58], and its DL reformulations [25, 22, 42]. As
in the propositional and DL constructions, once we have defined the notion of ranked interpretation to
model defeasible information, the problem is to decide which kind of entailment relation, that is, what
kind of defeasible reasoning, we would like to model. Despite it is recognised that there are multiple
available options according to the kind of properties we want to satisfy [56, 58, 57, 67, 26, 23, 42], it is
generally recognised that Lehmann and Magidor’s RC [58] is the fundamental construction in the area,
and most of the other proposed systems can be built as refinements of it. We recall that RC models
the so-called Presumption of Typicality [59, p.4], that is the reasoning principle imposing that, if we are
not informed about any exceptional property, we presume that we are dealing with a typical situation.
The essential behaviour characterising the presumption of typicality is that a subclass that does not show
any exceptional property inherits all the typical properties of the superclass. From a semantics point of
view the definition of RC can be obtained via various equivalent definitions [52, 58]: here we opt for
the characterisation of RC using the minimal ranked model [21, 67] and, in particular, we consider the
characterisation given by Giordano et al. [42], which we believe appropriate for our defeasible RDF
framework.
In the following, given a defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef and its strict counterpartGs (see Eq. 1),
let the interpretation IGs
IGs := 〈∆R,∆P,∆C,∆L,P[[·]],C[[·]], ·
IGs 〉 (2)
be defined from Gs as in Lemma 2.3, and consider the domains∆R,∆P,∆C,∆L in it. With M
G we de-
note the set of all ρdf⊥-interpretations defined over such domains, and we indicate a ranked interpretation
build overMG asRG = (MG, r). In the following, if clear from the context that a ranked interpretation
is built from a graphG as here indicated, we may omit the superscriptG in RG = (MG, r). 8
Now, given a defeasible graph G, let IG be the set of the ranked interpretations RG and let RG be
the elements of IG that are also models for G, that is,
RG := {R ∈ IG | R ρdf⊥ G} . (3)
Note that by Lemma 2.3, RG is not empty. Moreover, since the domains in Equation 2 are finite, M
G is
finite as well. Additionally, as a ranked interpretationRG = (MG, r) build over MG has to satisfy the
convexity property (see Definition 3.3), the ranking function r is bounded by |MG|.9 Therefore, IG is a
finite and, thus, so is RG.
Please note that by construction R,R′ ∈ RG differ only w.r.t. the involved ranking functions r, r′,
respectively, which induces the following order over the ranked models in RG.
Definition 3.5 (Presumption ordering). LetR = (M , r), R′ = (M , r′), andR,R′ ∈ RG. We define
1. R  R′ iff for every I ∈ M , r(I) 6 r′(I).
2. R ≺ R′ iffR  R′ andR′ 6 R.
3. min(RG) := {R ∈ RG | there is noR′ ∈ RG s.t. R′ ≺ R}.
The setmin(RG) contains the rankedmodels ofG in which the ρdf⊥-interpretations are ”pushed down”
as much as possible in the ranking, that is, they are considered as typical as possible.
We next show that actually there is an unique minimal ranked model for a defeasible graph.
Proposition 3.1. For every defeasible graphG, |min(RG)| = 1.
8Keep in mind that the domains of all interpretations occurring inRG are defined as in Equation 2.
9That is, the maximal rank of any interpretation in MG cannot exceed |MG|.
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Proof. Assume to the contrary that |min(RG)| > 1, i.e., there are R = (M , r), R′ = (M , r′), with
R,R′ ∈ min(RG) andR 6= R
′.
It cannot be the case thatR  R′ and R′  R, since that would imply that R = R′. Hence it must
be the case thatR andR′ are incomparable w.r.t. ; that is, there are at least two interpretations I,J in
M s.t. r(I) < r′(I) and r′(J ) < r(J ).
Now, consider R⋆ = (M , r⋆), with r⋆(I) = min{r(I), r′(I)} for every I ∈ M . Clearly, R⋆ ≺ R
and R⋆ ≺ R′. As next, let us prove that that R⋆ ρdf⊥ G. At first, note that R
⋆ ρdf⊥ G
str holds as
the satisfaction of Gstr depends only on M and not on the ranks. At second, assume to the contrary that
R⋆ 6ρdf⊥ G
def , that is, there is a defeasible triple 〈s, p, o〉 ∈ G such that R⋆ 6ρdf⊥ 〈s, p, o〉 and let’s
assume that 〈s, p, o〉 is of the form 〈c, sc, d〉 (the proof for the case 〈p, sp, q〉 is similar). That means that
there is I¯ ∈ c min(c,R⋆) s.t. I¯ 6ρdf⊥ (c, sc, d). But, by the definition of r
⋆, either I¯ ∈ c min(c,R) or
I¯ ∈ c min(c,R′) and, thus, eitherR 6ρdf⊥ 〈c, sc, d〉 orR
′ 6ρdf⊥ 〈c, sc, d〉 holds, against the hypothesis
that both R and R′ are ranked models of G. As a consequence, R⋆ ρdf⊥ G
def has to hold and, thus,
R⋆ ρdf⊥ G. That is, R
⋆ ∈ RG. But then, it can not be the case that R,R′ ∈ min(RG) as there is
R⋆ ∈ RG with R⋆ ≺ R andR⋆ ≺ R′, which is against our hypothesis. Therefore, there can not be two
distinct ranked modelsR,R′ in min(RG) and, asRG is not empty, |min(RG)| = 1 has to hold. ✷
In the following, the unique-minimal rankedmodel inRG is called theminimalG-model and is denoted
withRminG, i.e.,min(RG) = {RminG}.
Definition 3.6 (Minimal Entailment). Given a defeasible graph G and the corresponding minimal G-
modelRminG of G. A defeasible graph G minimally entails a triple Js, p, oK, denotedG |=min Js, p, oK,
iffRminG ρdf⊥ Js, p, oK.
Using the minimal ranking inRminG we can also define the height of a term, indicating at which level of
exceptionality a term t is not disjoint to itself, respectively as a class or as a predicate. This corresponds
to the minimal rank, that is, the rank in RminG, in which we encounter a ρdf⊥-interpretation that does
not satisfy (t,⊥c, t), or, respectively, (t,⊥p, t).
Definition 3.7 (Height). Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph, with RminG = {M , r} being its
minimal model, and let t be a term in G. The c-height of t corresponds to the lowest rank r(I) of some
I ∈ M s.t. I 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t), that is,
hcG(t) =
{
∞, if I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) for every I ∈ MN
min{r(I) | I ∈ M and I 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t)}, otherwise.
Analogously, the p-height of t corresponds to the lowest rank r(I) of some I ∈ M s.t. I 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)
hpG(t) =
{
∞, if I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t) for every I ∈ MN
min{r(I) | I ∈ M and I 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)}, otherwise.
H
Also, we define the height h(R) of a ranked interpretation R as the highest finite rank of the ρdf⊥-
interpretations in it. That is, letR = (M , r) be a ranked model, then
h(R) :=max{r(I) | I ∈ MN} .
Example 3.2. Consider the graph F , extending the graphG from Example 3.1 with the triple (r, sc, b).
F = {(p, sc, b), (r, sc, b), 〈b, sc, f〉, (p, sc, e), (e,⊥c, f)} ,
where r stands for robins. Its strict counterpart is
F s = {(p, sc, b), (r, sc, b), (b, sc, f), (p, sc, e), (e,⊥c, f)} .
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Given F s, we define the domains used for the models in RF following the construction in Lemma 2.3.
The minimal model RminF ∈ RF will be a model of height 1: all the ρdf⊥-interpretations that satisfy
F s will have height 0; all the ρdf⊥-interpretations that satisfy F
str but not (b, sc, f) will have height 1,
and all the ρdf⊥-interpretations that do not satisfy F
str will have infinite height.
As in Example 3.1, F s implies (p,⊥c, p). Also, it is easy to check that F s does not imply (b,⊥c, b)
and does not imply (r,⊥c, r), since we are informed that penguins do not fly, but we are not informed
that robins do not fly (there is no (r, sc, e) in our graph); also, F str does not imply (p,⊥c, p), since F str
does not contain (b, sc, f) anymore. The resulting configuration of RminF is such that: all the ρdf⊥-
interpretations with height 0 satisfy (p,⊥c, p), but not all of them satisfy (b,⊥c, b) or (r,⊥c, r); not all
the ρdf⊥-interpretations with height 1 satisfy (p,⊥c, p).
It is easy to check that RminF is a model of F : all the ρdf⊥-interpretations with finite height sat-
isfy the strict part F str; The minimal interpretations that do not satisfy (b,⊥c, b) have height 0, and
consequently satisfy (b, sc, f), hence the defeasible triple (b, sc, f) is satisfied too byRminF .
Note that there cannot be a model ofF that is preferred toRminF : if we move any ρdf⊥-interpretation
from height 1 to height 0, the resulting model would not satisfy 〈b, sc, f〉 anymore, and if we move any
ρdf⊥-interpretation from height∞ to any finite height, the resulting model would not satisfy F str.
Being a minimal model of F , RminF satisfies the presumption of typicality. To check this, it suffices
to determine what we can derive about robins: since robins do not have any exceptional property, they
should inherit all the typical properties of birds, and we should be able to derive that they presumably
fly. We have seen that at rank 0 all interpretations satisfy (r, sc, b) and (b, sc, f), but there are some
interpretations that do not satisfy (r,⊥c, r). Consequently, according to Definition 3.4, RminF ρdf⊥
〈r, sc, f〉, that is, F |=min 〈r, sc, f〉, as desired.
3.3 Exceptionality
Minimal entailment defines the semantics. We next define a decision procedure for it. To do so, we define
the notion of exceptionality, a reformulation in our context of a property that is fundamental for RC [58].
Informally, a class t (or, respectively, a predicate t) is exceptional w.r.t. a defeasible graph if there is no
typical situation in which t can be populated with some instance. Formally it corresponds to saying that in
every ranked model of the graph, all the ρdf⊥-interpretations with height 0 satisfy (t,⊥c, t) (respectively,
(t,⊥p, t)).
Definition 3.8 (Exceptionality). Let G be a defeasible ρdf⊥-graph, R = (M , r) be a ranked model in
RG and t be a term.
1. We say that t is c-exceptional (resp. p-exceptional) w.r.t. R if for every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0, we
have that I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) (resp. I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)).
2. We say that t is c-exceptional (resp. p-exceptional)w.r.t.G if it is c-exceptional (resp. p-exceptional)
w.r.t. allR ∈ RG.
It turns out that in order to check exceptionality w.r.t. a graph it is sufficient to refer to the minimal model
of the graph.
Proposition 3.2. A term t is c-exceptional (resp. p-exceptional) w.r.t. a defeasible graph G iff it is
c-exceptional (resp. p-exceptional) w.r.t. RminG.
Proof. Let t be c-exceptional.
⇒) Immediate from the definition of exceptionality.
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⇐) We proceed by contradiction: let t be c-exceptional w.r.t. RminG, and assume that there is a model
R = (M , rR) ∈ RG s.t. t is not c-exceptional w.r.t. R. That is, there is an I ∈ M s.t. rR(I) = 0
and I 6ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t). In such a case, by Definition 3.5 and Proposition 3.1, we would have that I
has rank 0 also inRminG. Consequently t cannot be c-exceptional w.r.t. RminG, which contradicts
our assumption.
The proof is analogous if t is p-exceptional. ✷
The following proposition represents the bridge between the semantic notion of exceptionality and ρdf⊥ de-
cidability, and it will be central in what follows.
Proposition 3.3. A term t is c-exceptional (resp., p-exceptional) w.r.t. a defeasible graphG iff Gs ⊢ρdf⊥
(t,⊥c, t) (resp., Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)).
In order to prove the above proposition, we introduce the notion of proof tree and prove some lemmas
beforehand. To start with, we reformulate the classical notion of proof tree for ρdf⊥.
Definition 3.9 (ρdf⊥ proof tree). A ρdf⊥ proof tree is a finite tree in which
• each node is a ρdf⊥ triple;
• every node is connected to the node(s) immediately above through one of the inference rules (1)-(7)
presented in Section 2.3.
Let T be a ρdf⊥ proof tree, H be the set of the triples appearing as top nodes (called leaves) and let
(s, p, o) be the triple appearing in the unique bottom node (called root). Then T is a ρdf⊥ proof tree from
H to (s, p, o).
For istance, in Example 3.1 we have a ρdf⊥ proof tree from {(p, sc, b), (b, sc, f), (p, sc, e), (e,⊥c, f)} to
(p,⊥c, p)}.
By Definitions 2.3 and 3.9, the following propositions is immediate to prove.
Proposition 3.4. Let G be a ρdf⊥ graph and (s, p, o) be a ρdf⊥ triple. ThenG ⊢ρdf⊥ (s, p, o) iff there is
a ρdf⊥ proof tree from H to (s, p, o) for some H ⊆ G.
As next we define a depth function on the trees.
Definition 3.10 (Immediate subtree and depth function d). Let T be a ρdf⊥ proof tree. The set of the
immediate subtrees of T , T = {T1, . . . , Tn}, are the trees Ti obtained from T by eliminating the root
node of T .
The depth d(T ) ∈ N of T is defined inductively the following way:
• if T is a single node then d(T ) = 0;
• else, d(T ) = 1 +max{d(T ′) | T ′ ∈ T}.
Now, we prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.5. Let T be a ρdf⊥ proof tree from H to (p, sc, q). Then T contains only triples of the form
(A, sc, B).
Proof. The proof is on induction on the depth d(T ) of T , where by assumption, T has (p, sc, q) as root.
Case d(T ) = 0. Hence, the tree’s only node is (p, sc, q), which concludes.
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Case d(T ) = 1. In this case, there is only one possible tree, obtained by instantiating rule (3a):
(p, sc, r), (r, sc, q)
(p, sc, q)
Remark 3.2. Note that we cannot instantiate rule (2b) in the form
(r, sp, sc), (p, r, q)
(p, sc, q)
,
as (r, sp, sc) is not allowed to occur in our language (see Section 2).
Case d(T ) = n+ 1. Let us assume that the lemma holds for all proof trees of depthm 6 n, with n > 1.
Let us show that it holds also for the case d(T ) = n+ 1 as well.
Note that the tree T of depth n+ 1 with root (p, sc, q) can only be built by taking two trees T1 and
T2 that have as roots triples of the form (Ai, sc, Bi) (i = 1, 2) with max(d(T1), d(T2)) = n, and
applying to their roots rule (3a). Therefore, by construction of T and by induction on Ti, also the
tree T of depth n+ 1 contains only triples of the form (A, sc, B), which concludes.
✷
Lemma 3.6. Let T be a ρdf⊥ proof tree from H to (p,⊥c, q). Then T contains only triples of the form
(A, sc, B) or (A,⊥c, B).
Proof. The proof is on induction on the depth d(T ) of T , where by assumption, T has (p,⊥c, q) as root.
Case d(T ) = 0. Hence, the tree’s only node is (p,⊥c, q), which concludes.
Case d(T ) = 1. In this case, there are only three possible trees, obtained by instantiating rules (5a), (5b)
or (5c): namely,
(q,⊥c, p)
(p,⊥c, q)
,
(s,⊥c, q), (p, sc, s)
(p,⊥c, q)
or
(p,⊥c, p)
(p,⊥c, q)
.
In all three cases the lemma is satisfied, which concludes.
Case d(T ) = n+ 1. Let us assume that the lemma holds for all proof trees of depthm 6 n, with n > 1.
Let us show that it holds also for the case d(T ) = n+ 1 as well.
Note that the tree T of depth n+ 1 with root (p,⊥c, q) can only be built in three ways:
• by applying rule (5a) to a tree T1 of depth n having as root a triple of form (A,⊥c, B);
• by applying the rule (5b) to two trees T2 and T3, with max(d(T2), d(T3)) = n, having as
root, respectively, a triple of form (A,⊥c, B) and a triple of form (A, sc, B);
• by applying rule (5c) to a tree T4 of depth n having as root a triple of form (A,⊥c, A);
Now, by construction of T , by induction hypothesis on T1, T2, T4 and by Lemma 3.5 applied to T3,
also the tree T of depth n + 1 contains only triples of the form (A, sc, B) and (A,⊥c, B), which
concludes.
✷
Note that a tree proving (t,⊥c, t) is just a particular case of Lemma 3.6.
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Lemma 3.7. Let G be a defeasible ρdf⊥-graph,R = (M , r) be a ranked model in RG and 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈
Gdef . For every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0, either I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) or I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
Analogously, for every 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdef and every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0, either I ρdf⊥ (p, sp, q) or
I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p).
Proof. The proof is immediate from the fact that every R in RG is a model of G and Definition 3.4. In
fact, if there is I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0 and I does satisfy neither (p, sc, q) nor (p,⊥c, p), then R 6ρdf⊥
〈p, sc, q〉 and, thus,R is not a model of G, against the hypothesis.
The proof for 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdef is similar. ✷
We can extend the above lemma to derived subclass and subproperty triples.
Lemma 3.8. LetG be a defeasible ρdf⊥-graph,R = (M , r) be a ranked model inRG and letGs ⊢ρdf⊥
(p, sc, q) for some terms p, q. For every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0, either I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) or I ρdf⊥
(p,⊥c, p).
Analogously, if Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sp, q) for some terms p, q, then for every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0, either
I ρdf⊥ (p, sp, q) or I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p).
Proof. We prove the first half, involving the subclass predicate.
So, assume Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) and let I be a ρdf⊥ interpretation in M that has rank 0. The proof is
on induction on the depth d(T ) of a tree T , where T has (p, sc, q) as root.
Case d(T ) = 0. Hence, the tree’s only node is (p, sc, q). Therefore, either (p, sc, q) ∈ Gstr or 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈
Gdef . In the former case I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q), as, beingR a model of G, every I ∈ M must satisfy
Gstr. In the latter case, by Lemma 3.7, either I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) or I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p), which
concludes.
Case d(T ) = 1. In this case, there is only one possible tree, obtained by instantiating rule (3a):
(p, sc, r), (r, sc, q)
(p, sc, q)
Assume I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q). As sc is a transitive relation, we have two possibilities only:
Case I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sc, r). Then, since (p, sc, r) ∈ G
s, it must be the case that 〈p, sc, r〉 ∈ Gdef and,
thus, by Lemma 3.7, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
Case I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, r) but I 6ρdf⊥ (r, sc, q). Then, since (r, sc, q) ∈ G
s, it must be the case that
〈r, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdef . By Lemma 3.7, I ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, r). So we have I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, r) and
I ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, r). Given the derivation rule (EmptySC’) and the fact that ⊢ρdf⊥ is sound,
we can conclude that I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
Therefore, either I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) or I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p), which concludes.
Case d(T ) = n+ 1. Let us assume that the lemma holds for all proof trees of depthm 6 n, with n > 1.
Let us show that it holds also for the case d(T ) = n + 1 as well, where T has (p, sc, q) as root.
Now, since d(T ) > 1, as for case d(T ) = 1, the only possibility is that the tree terminates with an
instantiation of rule (3a): that is,
(p, sc, r), (r, sc, q)
(p, sc, q)
where (p, sc, r) and (r, sc, q) are, respectively, the roots of trees T1 and T2, the immediate subtrees
of T , with max(d(T1), d(T2)) = n. By inductive hypothesis on Ti, either I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, r) or
I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p), and I ρdf⊥ (r, sc, q) or I ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, r).
As a consequence, we have three cases:
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Case I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p). The lemma is satisfied immediately.
Case I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, r) and I ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, r). Then, given the derivation rule (EmptySC’) and
the fact that ⊢ρdf⊥ is sound, we have I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p), which concludes.
Case I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, r) and I ρdf⊥ (r, sc, q). Then, by the transitivity of the interpretation of sc,
we have I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q), which concludes.
For the second half of the lemma, involving the predicate sp, the proof has exactly the same structure,
with the only difference that it refers to the rule (2a) instead of the rule (3a). ✷
Lemma 3.9. Let G be a defeasible graph, p and q terms, and let RminG = (M , r) be G’s minimal
model. If Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, q) then I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, q) for every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0.
Proof. Let G be a defeasible graph s.t. Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, q). Then by Proposition 3.4, there is a ρdf⊥
proof tree T fromH to (p,⊥c, q) for someH ⊆ Gs. We prove now the lemma by induction on the depth
d(T ) of T .
GivenRminG = (M , r), we need to prove that (p,⊥c, q) is satisfied by every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0.
Note that, asRminG is a model ofG, for every I ∈ M , I ρdf⊥ G
str holds (see Definition 3.4).
Case d(T ) = 0. The tree’s only node is (p,⊥c, q), that is in Gs. Recall that Gs is the union of Gstr and
the strict translation of the defeasible triples in Gdef (Equation 1). Note that (p,⊥c, q) cannot be
the strict form of a triple in Gdef , as the defeasible triples must contain sc or sp as second element
(Definition 3.1), hence (p,⊥c, q) ∈ Gstr. Being RminG a model of G, its strict part Gstr must be
satisfied by every I ∈ M and, as a consequence, the triple (p,⊥c, q) must be satisfied by every
I ∈ M with rank 0, which concludes.
Case d(T ) = 1. There are only three possible trees of depth 1 with a triple (p,⊥c, q) obtained by instan-
tiating rules (5a), (5b) or (5c):
(q,⊥c, p)
(p,⊥c, q)
,
(s,⊥c, q), (p, sc, s)
(p,⊥c, q)
or
(p,⊥c, p)
(p,⊥c, q)
.
In the first case, we can refer to the case d(T ) = 0 and the fact that I must satisfy the symmetry of
⊥c. The third case is similar to the first one taking into account that I must be c-exhaustive on ⊥c.
In the second case the tree consists of an instantiation of rule (5b), that has two premises, (s,⊥c, q)
and (p, sc, s), that must both be in Gs. (s,⊥c, q) does not have a correspondent defeasible triple,
so (s,⊥c, q) ∈ Gstr. Since Gstr must be satisfied by every ρdf-interpretation in a ranked model of
G, we have I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥c, q).
Concerning the premise (p, sc, s), we have two possible cases:
Case I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, s). In this case, from I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥c, q) and the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ , we can
conclude I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, q).
Case I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sc, s). In this case, (p, sc, s) ∈ G
s and I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sc, s) implies that (p, sc, s) /∈
Gstr , so 〈p, sc, s〉 ∈ Gdef must hold. By Lemma 3.7, I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sc, s), implies that I ρdf⊥
(p,⊥c, p). Now, by rule (5c) and the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ , we can conclude I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, q).
Case d(T ) = n+ 1. Let us assume that the proposition holds for all the proof trees of depthm 6 n, with
n > 1. Let us show that it holds also for the case d(T ) = n+ 1 as well, where T has (p,⊥c, q) as
root. Then, since d(T ) > 1, as for the case d(T ) = 1 the only three possibilities are that the tree
terminates with an application rule (5a), (5b) or (5c): that is,
(q,⊥c, p)
(p,⊥c, q)
,
(s,⊥c, q), (p, sc, s)
(p,⊥c, q)
or
(p,⊥c, p)
(p,⊥c, q)
.
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The first case is straightforward, since the immediate subtree of T would be a tree of depth n
that has (q,⊥c, p) as root: by inductive hypothesis I ρdf⊥ (q,⊥c, p) and, since I must satisfy the
symmetry of⊥c, we have I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, q). The third case can be proven similarly to the first case
by relying on fact that I is c-exhaustive over ∆C. In the second case (s,⊥c, q) and (p, sc, s) are,
respectively, the roots of trees T1 and T2, the immediate subtrees of T , withmax(d(T1), d(T2)) =
n. By inductive hypothesis on T1, I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥c, q). Concerning T2 and its root (p, sc, s) we have
two possible cases:
Case I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, s). In this case, by rule (5b) and the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ we conclude I ρdf⊥
(p,⊥c, q).
Case I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sc, s). In this case, by the second part of Lemma 3.8 we have I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
Now, by rule (5c) and the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ , we can conclude I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, q).
This concludes the proof of then lemma. ✷
The following is an immediate corollary of Lemma 3.9.
Corollary 3.10. For any a defeasible graph G and any term t, if Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) then t is c-
exceptional w.r.t. G.
Now we prove the analogous result for p-exceptionality.
Lemma 3.11. Let G be a defeasible graph, p, q be any pair of terms, and let RminG = (M , r) be G’s
minimal model. If Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q) then I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q) for every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0.
Proof. Let G be a defeasible graph s.t. Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q). Then by Proposition 3.4 there must be a
ρdf⊥ proof tree T deriving (p,⊥p, q) from some graphH ⊆ Gs. We prove now the lemma by induction
on the depth d(T ) of T .
GivenRminG = (M , r), we need to prove that (p,⊥p, q) is satisfied by every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0.
Note that, asRminG is a model ofG, for every I ∈ M , I ρdf⊥ G
str holds (see Definition 3.4).
Case d(T ) = 0. The tree’s only node is (p,⊥p, q), that is in Gs. Recall that Gs is the union of Gstr
and the strict translation of the defeasible triples in Gdef (Equation 1). Note that (p,⊥p, q) cannot
be the strict form of a triple in Gdef , since the defeasible triples must contain sc or sp as second
element (Definition 3.1), hence (p,⊥p, q) ∈ Gstr. Being RminG a model of G, its strict part Gstr
must be satisfied by every I ∈ M (see Definition 3.4), and as a consequence the triple (p,⊥p, q)
must be satisfied by every I ∈ M with rank 0, which concludes.
Case d(T ) = 1. There are five possible trees of depth 1 with a triple (p,⊥p, q) as root, obtained by
instantiating rule (6a), (6b), (6c), (7a) or (7b): i.e.,
(1)
(q,⊥p,p)
(p,⊥p,q)
(2)
(s,⊥p,q),(p,sp,s)
(p,⊥p,q)
(3)
(p,⊥p,p)
(p,⊥p,q)
(4)
(p,dom,r),(q,dom,s),(r,⊥c,s)
(p,⊥p,q)
(5)
(p,range,r),(q,range,s),(r,⊥c,s)
(p,⊥p,q)
.
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Case (1). We can refer to the case d(T ) = 0 and the fact that I must satisfy the symmetry of ⊥p.
Case (3). This case is similar to Case (1) by referring to the fact that I is c-exhaustive.
Case (2). The tree consists of an instantiation of rule (6b), that has two premises, (s,⊥p, q) and
(p, sp, s), that must both be in Gs. (s,⊥p, q) does not have a correspondent defeasible triple,
so (s,⊥p, q) ∈ Gs implies (s,⊥p, q) ∈ Gstr. Since Gstr must be satisfied by every ρdf-
interpretation in a ranked model of G, we have I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥p, q).
Concerning, the premise (p, sp, s), we have two possible cases:
Case I ρdf⊥ (p, sp, s). In this case, from I ρdf⊥ (p, sp, s), I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥p, q), and the
soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ , we can conclude I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q).
Case I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sp, s). In this case, the situation in which (p, sp, s) ∈ G
s and I 6ρdf⊥
(p, sp, s) is possible only if (p, sp, s) ∈ Gdef . By Lemma 3.7, we have I ρdf⊥
(p,⊥p, p). Now, by rule (6c) and the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ we can conclude I ρdf⊥
(p,⊥p, q).
Case (4). (p, dom, r), (q, dom, s), (r,⊥c, s) are in G
s, and since they cannot have a defeasible
version, they must be in Gstr too. All the triples in Gstr must be satisfied by every I ∈ M .
This, together with the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ , guarantees that I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q).
Case (5). Exactly as Case (4), just consider the triples of form (A, range, B) instead of the triples
(A, dom, B).
Case d(T ) = n+ 1. Let us assume that the proposition holds for all the proof trees of depthm 6 n, with
n > 1. Let us show that it holds also for the case d(T ) = n+ 1 as well, where T has (p,⊥p, q) as
root. Then, since d(T ) > 1, as for the case with d(T ) = 1 there are five possibilities, with the tree
terminating with an application of the rule (6a), (6b), (6c), (7a) or (7b): namely,
(1)
(q,⊥p,p)
(p,⊥p,q)
(2)
(s,⊥p,q),(p,sp,s)
(p,⊥p,q)
(3)
(p,⊥p,p)
(p,⊥p,q)
(4)
(p,dom,r),(q,dom,s),(r,⊥c,s)
(p,⊥p,q)
(5)
(p,range,r),(q,range,s),(r,⊥c,s)
(p,⊥p,q)
.
Case (1). Straightforward, as the immediate subtree of T is a tree of depth n that has (q,⊥p, p) as
root: by inductive hypothesis I ρdf⊥ (q,⊥p, p) and, since I must satisfy the symmetry of
⊥p, we have I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q).
Case (3). The proof is as for Case (1) by referring to the fact that I is c-exhaustive.
Case (2). (s,⊥p, q) and (p, sp, s) are, respectively, the roots of T1 and T2, the immediate subtrees
of T , with max(d(T1), d(T2)) = n. By inductive hypothesis on T1, I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥p, q).
Concerning T2 and its root (p, sp, s), we have two possible cases:
Case I ρdf⊥ (p, sp, s). In this case, from I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥p, q) and by the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥
we can conclude I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q).
Case I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sp, s). In this case, by Lemma 3.8 we have I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p). Now, by
rule (6c) and the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ we can conclude I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q).
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Case (4). Please note that for every pair of terms p, q,Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, dom, q) holds only if (p, dom, q) ∈
Gs: no triple of form (A, dom, B) can be derived, since there are no rules in ρdf⊥that have
triples of form (A, dom, B) as conclusions. The only possibility could be the rule (2b), by
substituting E with dom, but in that case in the premises we would have a triple with dom in
the third position, that is not acceptable in our language (see Section 2.1).
Since the triples (A, dom, B) do not have a defeasible version, (p, dom, q) ∈ Gs implies
that (p, dom, q) ∈ Gstr , and consequently I ρdf⊥ (p, dom, q). It follows that in case the
tree T terminates with an application of rule (7a), it will have three immediate subtrees: two
trees will both have depth 0 and will consist, respectively, only of the nodes (p, dom, r) and
(q, dom, s); the third subtree, called T ′, will have have (r,⊥c, s) as root.
We know from Lemma 3.9 applied to T ′ that I ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, s). So we have that I ρdf⊥
(p, dom, r), I ρdf⊥ (q, dom, s), I ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, s), and, by the soundness of ⊢ρdf⊥ , we can
conclude I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, q).
Case (5). The proof for this case is analogous to Case (4): it is sufficient to substitute dom with
range.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷
An immediate corollary of Lemma 3.11 is the following.
Corollary 3.12. For any a defeasible graph G and any term t, if Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t) then t is p-
exceptional w.r.t. G.
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
⇒ .) Let us show that if a term t is c-exceptional (resp., p-exceptional) w.r.t. a defeasible graphG, then
Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) (resp., G
s ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)).
Let t be a term in G, and let t be c-exceptional (resp., p-exceptional) w.r.t. G. Then t is c-
exceptional (resp., p-exceptional) w.r.t. RminG = (M , r), that is, for every I ∈ M s.t. r(I) = 0,
we have that I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) (resp., I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)). Now, we need to prove that G
s ⊢ρdf⊥
(t,⊥c, t) (resp.,Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)).
Let IGs be the canonical model of Gs. By construction and Lemma 2.3, IGs ∈ M . It is now
sufficient to prove that r(IGs) = 0. Let us proceed by contradiction by assuming that r(IGs) > 0,
and letR′ = (M , r′) be the ranked interpretation obtained fromRminG, with for every I ∈ M ,
r′(I) =
{
0 if I = IGs
r(I) otherwise .
We can easily check thatR′ is a model ofG = Gstr ∪Gdef :
• R′ is still a model ofGstr , since the satisfaction of ρdf⊥-triples is not affected by the ranking
function.
• for every 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdef , IGs ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) since IGs is a model of G
s. Now we have
two cases:
IGs ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) . In such a case, by Definition 3.4, IGs /∈ c min(p,R
′) and IGs is
irrelevant to decide the satisfaction of 〈p, sc, q〉 in R′. Consequently c min(p,R′) =
c min(p,RminG), andRminG ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉 impliesR
′ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉.
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Procedure ExceptionalC(G)
Input: Defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef
Output: Set ǫc(G) of c-exceptional triples w.r.t. G
1: ǫc(G) :=∅
2: for all 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdef do
3: if Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) then
4: ǫc(G) :=ǫc(G) ∪ {〈p, sc, q〉}
5: return ǫc(G)
IGs 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) . Then, since r
′(IGs) = 0 and r′(I) = r(I) for all the other elements
I of M , R′ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉. Otherwise in R
′ there should be an I ′ with rank 0 s.t.
I ′ 6ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) and I
′ 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p). But then also and RminG should contain
such I ′ at rank 0, but that cannot be the case, as otherwise RminG would not satisfy
〈p, sc, q〉, against the fact thatRminG is a model of G.
HenceR′ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉.
• We proceed analogously to prove that for every 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdef ,R′ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sp, q〉.
Therefore, R′ is a model of G, but by Definition 3.5 we also have R′ ≺ RminG, against the
definition ofRminG. Consequently it must be the case that r(IGs) = 0, that implies that, for every
t, IGs ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) (resp., IGs ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)).
Since IGs is the canonical model for Gs, Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) (resp.,G
s ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)).
⇐ .) Let us show that given a defeasible graph G, if Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) (resp., G
s ⊢ρdf⊥ (t,⊥p, t)),
then a term t is c-exceptional (resp., p-exceptional) w.r.t. G.
This is an immediate consequence of Corollaries 3.10 and 3.12.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.3. ✷
Proposition 3.3 gives us a correct and complete correspondence between the semantic notions of c-
exceptionality and p-exceptionality with the ρdf⊥ decision procedure ⊢ρdf⊥ . This correspondence allows
us then to compute all the c-exceptional triples and all the p-exceptional ones, as illustrated by the proce-
dures ExceptionalC(G) and ExceptionalP(G), respectively, where the notion of exceptional triple is
defined in the obvious way:
Definition 3.11 (Exceptional triple). Let G be a defeasible ρdf⊥-graph. We say that a defeasible triple
〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdef (resp. 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdef ) is c-exceptional (resp. p-exceptional) w.r.t. G if p is c-
exceptional (resp. p-exceptional) w.r.t. G.
Procedure ExceptionalP(G)
Input: Defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef
Output: Set ǫp(G) of p-exceptional triples w.r.t. G
1: ǫp(G) :=∅
2: for all 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdef do
3: if Gs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p) then
4: ǫp(G) :=ǫc(G) ∪ {〈p, sp, q〉}
5: return ǫp(G)
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Procedures ExceptionalC(G) and ExceptionalP(G) correctly model exceptionality, as proved by the
following immediate corollary of Proposition 3.3.
Corollary 3.13. Given a defeasible graphG and a defeasible triple 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdef (resp., 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈
Gdef ), 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ ǫc(G) (resp., 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ ǫp(G)) iff it is c-exceptional (resp. p-exceptional) w.r.t. G.
3.4 The ranking procedure
Iteratively applied, the notions of c-exceptionality and p-exceptionality allow us to associate to every
term, i.e., to every defeasible triple, a rank value w.r.t. a defeasible graph G. Specifically, we introduce
a ranking procedure, called Ranking(G), that orders the defeasible information in Gdef into a sequence
D0, . . . , Dn, D∞ of sets Di of defeasible triples, with n > 0 and D∞ possibly empty. The procedure is
shown below.
Procedure Ranking(G)
Input: Defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef
Output: ranking r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞}
1: D0 :=G
def
2: i :=0
3: repeat
4: Di+1 :=ExceptionalC(G
str ∪ Di) ∪ ExceptionalP(G
str ∪ Di)
5: i :=i+ 1
6: until Di = Di+1
7: D∞ :=Di
8: r(G) :={D0, . . . , Di−1, D∞}
9: return r(G)
The ranking procedure is built on top of the ExceptionalC and ExceptionalP procedures, using
ρdf⊥decision steps only.
We next prove that the ranking procedure Ranking(G) correctly mirrors the ranking of the defeasible
information w.r.t. the height functions hcG and h
p
G. Specifically, we want to show (see Proposition 3.19
later on) that
• for i < n, 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Di \ Di+1 iff h
c
G(p) = i;
• for i = n, 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Dn \ D∞ iff hcG(p) = n,
and an analogous result w.r.t. hpG.
To do so, we need to introduce some preliminary constructions and lemmas.
To start with, let us note that the information in a graphG = Gstr∪Gdef is ranked from the semantical
point of view by the minimal modelRminG = (M , r) and the height functions hcG and h
p
G defined on it.
Let RiminG = (M
i, ri) be the submodel of RminG obtained by eliminating all the ρdf⊥ interpretations
in M whose height is strictly less than i (i > 0). Specifically, given a graph G = Gstr ∪ Gdef and its
minimal modelRminG = (M , r), RiminG = (M
i, ri) is defined as follows:
• M i :={I ∈ M | r(I) > i};
• ri(I) :=r(I) − i, for every I ∈ M i.
That is, RiminG is obtained from RminG by eliminating all the interpretations that have a rank of i − 1
or less. We next show that the interpretationRiminG models the defeasible information in the graph that
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has a higher level of exceptionality: the higher the value of i, the higher the level of exceptionality. That
is, given a defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef , let
Gi :=Gstr ∪Gdefi , (4)
where
Gdefi :={〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ G
def | hcG(p) > i} ∪ {〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ G
def | hpG(p) > i} . (5)
Then the following proves thatRiminG is indeed a model ofG
i.
Lemma 3.14. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph and RminG = (M , r) its minimal ranked
model. ThenRiminG = (M
i, ri) is a model of the subgraphGi = Gstr ∪Gdefi .
Proof. RminG = (M , r) is a model of G. Hence all the interpretations in M are models of Gstr and,
since M i ⊆ M , also RiminG satisfies G
str. Concerning the defeasible triples in Gdefi , we proceed
by contradiction, assuming RiminG is not a model of G
i. So, let 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdefi and R
i
minG 6ρdf⊥
〈p, sc, q〉, that is, there is a ρdf⊥-interpretation I s.t. I ∈ c min(p,RiminG) and I 6ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉.
Since hcG(p) > i, c min(p,R
i
minG) = c min(p,RminG), and consequently RminG 6ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉,
against the assumption that RminG is the minimal model of G. The case 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ G
def
i is proved
similarly, which concludes. ✷
Now, it turns out that the minimal model forGi, that is built using the set of ρdf⊥-interpretationsM , can
easily be defined by extendingRiminG. That is, letR
∗
i = (M , r
∗
i ) be a ranked interpretation where r
∗
i is
defined as
r∗i (I) =
{
ri(I) if I ∈ M i
0 otherwise .
The following holds.
Lemma 3.15. Given a defeasible graphG, R∗i is the minimal model of the subgraphG
i.
Proof. At first, we prove that R∗i is a model of G
i. So, let RminG be the minimal model of the graph
G. From the definitions of RminG, RiminG and R
∗
i it is clear that for every I ∈ M , r
∗
i (I) < ∞
iff r(I) < ∞. Hence R∗i ρdf⊥ G
str. Now, let 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdefi . From the construction of G
def
i ,
RiminG and R
∗
i , we have that for 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ G
def
i it holds that h
c
G(p) > i. Therefore, since for every
I ∈ M \M i r(I) < i, it must be the case that I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) and, thus, for all the ρdf-interpretations
I ∈ M \M i, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
A consequence, for every 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdefi , c min(p,RminG) = c min(p,R
i
minG), and since
RminG ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉 for every 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ G
def
i , R
∗
i ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉 has to hold too.
Analogously, for every 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdefi , we have that
• for all the ρdf-interpretations I ∈ M \M i, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p);
• p min(p,RminG) = p min(p,RiminG); and
• for every 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdefi , R
∗
i ρdf⊥ 〈p, sp, q〉.
Therefore,R∗i is a model of G
i.
As next, we have to prove that R∗i is in fact the minimal model of G
i. To do so, we proceed by
contradiction, by assuming that this is not the case. Then there is a model R′ = (M , r′) of Gi s.t. for
every I ∈ M , r′(I) 6 r∗(I), and there is an I ′ ∈ M s.t. r′(I ′) < r∗(I ′). Note that, since r∗(I) = 0
for every I ∈ M \M i, I ′ ∈ M i necessarily. We have to prove that such anR′ cannot exist.
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Given RminG = (M , r) and R′ = (M , r′), we build a ranked interpretation R+ = (M , r+)
defining r+ in the following way:
r+(I) =
{
r′(I) + i if I ∈ M i
r(I) otherwise.
That is,
• r+(I) = r(I) for every I ∈ M \M i;
• from the definitions of ri, r′ and r+ we can conclude that r+(I) 6 r(I) for every I ∈ M i, and
there is an I ′ ∈ M i s.t. r+(I ′) < r(I ′).
As a consequence,R+ ≺ RminG. Also,R+ is a model of G, because
• all the ρdf⊥-interpretations I ∈ M are models of Gstr, henceR+ ρdf⊥ G
str;
• for all the defeasible triples 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdef \ Gdefi , c min(p,R
+) = c min(p,RminG), and,
sinceRminG ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉, we haveR
+ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉;
• analogously, for all the defeasible triples 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdef\Gdefi , p min(p,R
+) = p min(p,RminG),
and, sinceRminG ρdf⊥ 〈p, sp, q〉, we haveR
+ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sp, q〉;
• for all the defeasible triples 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdefi , c min(p,R
+) = c min(p,R′), and, sinceR′ ρdf⊥
〈p, sc, q〉, we haveR+ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉;
• analogously, for all the defeasible triples 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdefi , p min(p,R
+) = p min(p,R′), and,
sinceR′ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sp, q〉, we haveR
+ ρdf⊥ 〈p, sp, q〉.
Therefore,R+ is a model of G, which is impossible, asRminG is the minimal model of G and, thus,
R∗i is the minimal model of the subgraphG
i. ✷
The following lemma connects the height of a term with the notion of exceptionality in the modelsR∗i .
Lemma 3.16. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph and let RminG be its minimal model, with
h(RminG) = n. For every i 6 n and term p s.t. hcG(p) > i (resp., h
p
G(p) > i) p is c-exceptional (resp.,
p-exceptional) w.r.t.RiminG = (M
i, ri) iff it is c-exceptional (resp., p-exceptional) w.r.t.R∗i = (M , r
∗
i ).
Proof. Let i 6 n, with R∗i = (M , r
∗) and RiminG = (M
i, ri) be the models of Gi built as described
above.
For every I ∈ Mi, ri(I) = r∗i (I). If I ∈ M \ M
i we have seen above that r∗(I) = 0 and
I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) for every term p s.t. h
c
G(p) > i.
Given these facts, the following statements are equivalent:
• p is not c-exceptional w.r.t.RiminG;
• there is an I ∈ M i s.t. ri(I) = 0 and I 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p);
• there is an I ∈ M i s.t. r∗i (I) = 0 and I 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p);
• p is not c-exceptional w.r.t.R∗i .
Analogously, we can prove that if we consider a term p s.t. hpG(p) > i, the following statements are
equivalent:
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• p is not p-exceptional w.r.t.RiminG;
• there is an I ∈ M i s.t. ri(I) = 0 and I 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p);
• there is an I ∈ M i s.t. r∗i (I) = 0 and I 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p);
• p is not p-exceptional w.r.t.R∗i ,
which concludes the proof. ✷
The following lemma connects the height to the computation of exceptionality.
Lemma 3.17. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph, and RminG = (M , r) its minimal model,
with h(RminG) = n, and 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdef . Then,
• for every i < n, hcG(p) > i+ 1 iff 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ ExceptionalC(G
i);
• for i = n, hcG(p) =∞ iff 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ ExceptionalC(G
i).
Analogously, let 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdef . Then,
• for every i < n, hpG(p) > i+ 1 iff 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ ExceptionalP(G
i).
• for i = n, hpG(p) =∞ iff 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ ExceptionalP(G
i).
Proof. Let 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdef .
For i < n, the following statements are equivalent:
• hcG(p) > i+ 1;
• for all I ∈ M \M i+1, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p);
• for all I ∈ M \M i, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) and p is c-exceptional w.r.t.R
i
minG;
• for all I ∈ M \M i, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) and p is c-exceptional w.r.t. R
∗
i (by Lemma 3.16);
• p is c-exceptional w.r.t.Gi (by Lemma 3.15);
• 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ ExceptionalC(Gi) (by Corollary 3.13).
For i = n, the following statements are equivalent:
• hcG(p) =∞;
• for all the I ∈ M \M∞, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p);
• for all the I ∈ M \M n, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) and p is c-exceptional w.r.t.R
n
minG;
• for all the I ∈ M \M n, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) and p is c-exceptional w.r.t. R
∗
i (by Lemma 3.16);
• p is c-exceptional w.r.t.Gn (by Lemma 3.15);
• 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ ExceptionalC(Gn) (by Corollary 3.13).
This proves the first half of the proposition.
For triples 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdef the proof is analogous, which concludes. ✷
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We nowmove on to prove the correspondence between the ranking procedure and the height (the semantic
ranking of the defeasible information).
Given a defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef , GDi (i > 0) is the subgraph of G defined as follows:
GDi :=G
str ∪ Di , (6)
where Di is in the output of Ranking(G), i.e., Di ∈ r(G). Our objective now is to prove that Gi = GDi .
To prove that for every i, Gi = GDi , it is sufficient to prove that for every rank value i 6= ∞ a term t is
exceptional w.r.t. GDi iff it is exceptional w.r.t. R
i
minG.
The following can be shown.
Lemma 3.18. Let G be a defeasible graph, with n being the height of its minimal model. Then, for every
i 6 n, Gi = GDi .
Proof. We prove it by induction on the value of i. If i = 0, then Gdef0 = G
def = D0, that is, G
0 = GD0.
Now, assume that Gi = GDi holds for all i < n, which implies also G
def
i = Di. By Lemma 3.17,
for every 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Gdefi , 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ G
def
i+1 iff 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ ExceptionalC(G
i) iff 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈
ExceptionalC(GDi ), that in turn is equivalent to 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Di+1.
Analogously, by Lemma 3.17, for every 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Gdefi , 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ G
def
i+1 iff 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈
ExceptionalP(Gi) iff 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ ExceptionalP(GDi ), that in turn is equivalent to 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Di+1,
which concludes. ✷
Now we can state the main proposition for our ranking procedure.
Proposition 3.19. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph, 〈p, sc, q〉 (resp., 〈p, sp, q〉) be in Gdef ,
and r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞} be the ranking obtained by Ranking(G). The following statements hold:
• for i < n, 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Di \ Di+1 iff hcG(p) = i;
• for i = n, 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Dn \ D∞ iff hcG(p) = n.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemma 3.18. ✷
Another consequence of Lemma 3.18 is the following corollary, that will be useful later on.
Corollary 3.20. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph, with r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞} being the
ranking obtained by Ranking(G), and let p be a term. The following statements hold:
• hcG(p) = 0 if and only if G
D
0 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p);
• for every i, 0 < i 6 n, hcG(p) = i if and only if G
D
i−1 ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) andG
D
i 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p);
• hcG(p) =∞ if and only if G
D
n ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
Analogously,
• hpG(p) = 0 if and only if G
D
0 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p);
• for every i, 0 < i 6 n, hpG(p) = i if and only if G
D
i−1 ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p) and G
D
i 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p);
• hcG(p) =∞ if and only if G
D
n ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p).
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3.3, Lemma 3.17 and Lemma 3.18. ✷
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3.5 Decision procedures for defeasible ρdf
In this section we present our main decision procedures. That is, given triples 〈p, sc, q〉, 〈p, sp, q〉 and
(s, p, o) as queries, the procedures below decide whether they are or not minimally entailed by a defeasible
graphG.
Remark 3.3. Given a fixed defeasible graphG, we assume that its ranking r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞} =
Ranking(G) has already been computed .
We start with the case of ρdf⊥-triples of the form (s, p, o). The procedure StrictMinEntailmentbelow
decides whetherG |=min (s, p, o) holds.
Procedure StrictMinEntailment(G, r(G), (s, p, o))
Input: GraphG = Gstr ∪Gdef , ranking r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞}, a ρdf⊥-triple (s, p, o)
Output: true iff G |=min (s, p, o)
1: G′ :=Gstr ∪ {(p,⊥c, p) | 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ D∞} ∪ {(p,⊥p, p) | 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ D∞}
2: return G′ ⊢ρdf⊥ (s, p, o)
The following lemma can be proved, which motivates the construction of graph G′ in the procedure
above.
Lemma 3.21. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph, r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞} its ranking, and
RminG = (M , r) its minimal model. Then I ∈ MN iff I ρdf⊥ G
str ∪ {(p,⊥c, p) | 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈
D∞} ∪ {(p,⊥p, p) | 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ D∞}.
Proof.
⇒) From the construction of G = Gstr ∪Gdef and Proposition 3.19, it is obvious that if I ∈ MN then
I ρdf⊥ G
str ∪ {(p,⊥c, p) | 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ D∞} ∪ {(p,⊥p, p) | 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ D∞}.
⇐) We proceed by contradiction. Assume there is a ρdf⊥-interpretation I ′ ∈ M s.t. r(I ′) = ∞ and
I ′ ρdf⊥ G
str ∪ {(p,⊥c, p) | 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ D∞} ∪ {(p,⊥p, p) | 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ D∞}.
Consider h(RminG) (see Definition 3.7), and letR′ = (M , r′) be a ranked interpretation where r′
is defined in the following way:
r′(I) =


r(I) if I ∈ MN
n+ 1 if I = I ′
∞ otherwise.
Informally, R′ has been obtained from RminG simply by moving I ′ from rank ∞ to the top of
MN. ClearlyR′ ≺ RminG, since for every I ∈ M , r′(I) 6 r(I), and r′(I ′) < r(I ′).
It is easy to check that R′ is a model of G: every model with a finite rank satisfies Gstr; for
every 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ Di, for i <∞, c min(p,R′) = c min(p,RminG), and consequentlyR′ ρdf⊥
〈p, sc, q〉. Analogously for every 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ Di, for i < ∞. For every 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ D∞, every
model with a finite rank satisfies (p,⊥p, p); analogously for every 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ D∞. Hence R′ is a
model of G andR′ ≺ RminG, against the assumption thatRminG is the minimal model of G.
As a consequently for every I, I ρdf⊥ G
str ∪ {(p,⊥c, p) | 〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ D∞} ∪ {(p,⊥p, p) |
〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ D∞} implies I ∈ MN.
✷
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The following theorem establishes correctness and completeness of the StrictMinEntailment proce-
dure.
Theorem 3.22. Consider a defeasible graphG and a ρdf⊥-triple (s, p, o). Then
G |=min (s, p, o) iff StrictMinEntailment(G, r(G), (s, p, o)) .
Proof. By Lemma 3.21 and Theorem 2.1 we have thatG |=min (s, p, o) if and only ifGstr ∪{(p,⊥c, p) |
〈p, sc, q〉 ∈ D∞} ∪ {(p,⊥p, p) | 〈p, sp, q〉 ∈ D∞} ρdf⊥ (s, p, o). Therefore, the procedure
StrictMinEntailment is correct and complete. ✷
We next consider triples of the form 〈p, sc, q〉. The decision procedure DefMinEntailmentC below
decides whetherG |=min 〈p, sc, q〉 holds.
Procedure DefMinEntailmentC(G, r(G), 〈p, sc, q〉)
Input: GraphG = Gstr ∪Gdef , ranking r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞}, defeasible triple 〈p, sc, q〉
Output: true iff G |=min 〈p, sc, q〉
1: i :=0
2: Dn+1 :=D∞
3: repeat
4: if i 6 n then
5: G′ :=Gstr ∪ (Di)s
6: j :=i
7: i :=i+ 1
8: else
9: return true
10: until G′ 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p)
11: Dp :={〈r, sc, s〉 | 〈r, sc, s〉 ∈ Dj \ Dj+1}
12: return Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q)
To establish the correctness and completeness of procedure DefMinEntailmentCwe prove some lemmas
beforehand.
Let us recall that by Lemma 3.5, every proof tree with a triple (p, sc, q) as root contains only triples
of the form (A, sc, B). From it, the following can be proven.
Lemma 3.23. Let T be a proof tree from a graph H to a triple (p, sc, q), and let I be a model of H . If
I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥c, s) for some triple (s, sc, o) ∈ H , then I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the depth of the proof tree T .
Case d(T ) = 0. In this case, H = {(p, sc, q)}. Consequently I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) obviously implies
I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
Case d(T ) = 1. The only way of deriving a triple of form (p, sc, q) is using the rule (3a), as shown in
the proof of Lemma 3.5. Hence the proof tree consist of an instantiation of rule (3a) with (p, sc, q)
as root.
(3a) (p,sc,t),(t,sc,q)(p,sc,q)
Now, assume that I ρdf⊥ (A,⊥c, A) holds for the antecedent of at least one of the two premises,
i.e., I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) or I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) holds. We have to prove that I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
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Case (1). I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p). The result is immediate.
Case (2). I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t). Then together with I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, t) we derive I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p),
by the soundness of rule (5b).
Case d(T ) = n+ 1. Assume that the proposition holds for all the proof trees with depth m 6 n, with
n > 1. Let us show that it holds also for trees of depth n+ 1. So, let T be a proof tree fromH to
(p, sc, q) with depth n + 1. The last step in T must correspond to an instantiation of the rule (3a)
with (p, sc, q) as root:
(3a) (p,sc,t),(t,sc,q)(p,sc,q)
Hence T has two immediate subtrees: T ′, having (p, sc, t) as root, and T ′′, having (t, sc, q) as root;
each of them has a depth of at most n. Since we assume that the proposition holds for trees of
depth at most n, if I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥c, s) for some (s, sc, o) ∈ H , then by induction hypothesis either
I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) (if (s, sc, o) appears as a leaf in T
′) or I ρdf⊥ (t,⊥c, t) (if (s, sc, o) appears
as a leaf in T ′′). Likewise case d(T ) = 1, in both the cases we can conclude I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p),
which concludes the proof.
✷
Lemma 3.24. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph, and let r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞} be its
ranking. For any pair of terms p, q s.t. hcG(p) 6 n,
G |=min 〈p, sc, q〉 iff G
str ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) .
where Dp is defined as in the DefMinEntailmentC procedure.
Proof. Consider G = Gstr ∪ Gdef and let RminG = (M , r) be its minimal model. Let hcG(p) = k,
with k 6 n. From Corollary 3.20 we can conclude that in the the DefMinEntailmentC procedure,
G′ 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) for j = k, and D
p = {〈r, sc, s〉 | 〈r, sc, s〉 ∈ Dk \ Dk+1}.
We have to prove that G |=min 〈p, sc, q〉 iff Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q).
⇐ .) Let us show that Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) implies G |=min 〈p, sc, q〉. So, assume G
str ∪
(Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q). To proveG |=min 〈p, sc, q〉we need to show that for every I ∈ c min(p,RminG),
I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) holds.
We proceed by contradiction. So, assume that I ∈ c min(p,RminG) and I 6ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q).
I ∈ c min(p,RminG) implies I 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p). Also, since h
c
G(p) = k, r(I) = k follows.
Since Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q), I 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) and I ρdf⊥ G
str (Lemma 3.21), then
there is at least a triple in (Dp)s that is not satisfied by I. By Lemma 3.5 such a triple must be of
the kind (s, sc, t). In particular, Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) implies that there must be a graph
H ⊆ Gstr ∪ (Dp)s s.t. there is a proof tree T proving (p, sc, q) from H , and there is some triple
(s, sc, t) ∈ H ∩ (Dp)s s.t. I 6ρdf⊥ (s, sc, t). As 〈s, sc, t〉 ∈ Dk \ Dk+1, by Proposition 3.19 we
have hcG(s) = k. h
c
G(s) = k and r(I) = k imply that if I 6ρdf⊥ (s, sc, t), then I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥c, s)
(I /∈ c min(s,RminG)), otherwiseRminG would not be a model ofG. However, by Lemma 3.23,
I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥c, s) implies I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p), against the hypothesis that I ∈ c min(p,RminG).
Therefore, we must conclude that I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q).
⇒ .) Let us show that G |=min 〈p, sc, q〉 implies Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q). So, let h
c
G(p) = k, with
k 6 n. G |=min 〈p, sc, q〉 means that, given the minimal modelRminG = (M , r), for I ∈ M s.t.
r(I) = k and I 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p), I ∈ c min(p,RminG) and I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q).
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Now, consider the graph G∗ :=Gstr ∪ (Dk \ Dk+1)s ∪ {(r⊥cr) | 〈r, sc, t〉 ∈ Dk+1} ∪ {(r⊥pr) |
〈r, sp, t〉 ∈ Dk+1}. That is, G
∗ contains all the strict triples in G, Gstr, all the defeasible triples
that are satisfied at height k, that is, Di \ Di+1, and for all the triples that are exceptional in k, the
set {(r⊥cr) | 〈r, sc, t〉 ∈ Dk+1} ∪ {(r⊥pr) | 〈r, sp, t〉 ∈ Dk+1}.
Let IG∗ be the characteristic ρdf⊥ model ofG∗, built as defined in Lemma 2.3. We know that IG∗
satisfies exactly Cl(G∗). Also, IG∗ ∈ M , as it can be checked by the definition in Section 3.2 of
the ranked interpretations inRG.
Since IG∗ satisfies I ρdf⊥ G
str ∪ {(r,⊥c, r) | 〈r, sc, t〉 ∈ D∞} ∪ {(r,⊥p, r) | 〈r, sp, t〉 ∈ D∞},
by Lemma 3.21 it must be in MN. Moreover, it must hold that r(IG∗) = k, since:
• for every triple 〈s, sc, t〉 ∈ Dk \ Dk+1 (resp., 〈s, sp, t〉 ∈ Dk \ Dk+1) IG∗ does not sat-
isfy (s,⊥c, s) (resp., (s,⊥p, s)), while h
c
G(s) = k (resp., h
p
G(s) = k). Hence it cannot be
r(IG∗) < k.
• IG∗ is compatible with r(IG∗) = k, since it satisfies all the triples in Dk \ Dk+1 and for
every 〈s, sc, t〉 ∈ Dk+1, IG∗ ρdf⊥ (s,⊥c, s) (resp., for every 〈s, sp, t〉 ∈ Dk+1, IG∗ ρdf⊥
(s,⊥p, s)).
• RminG assigns the minimal rank to every ρdf⊥interpretation, and since IG∗ is compatible
with r(IG∗) = k and not with r(IG∗) < k, we can conclude r(IG∗) = k.
hcG(p) = k implies that G
D
k 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) (Corollary 3.20). Since G
D
k ρdf⊥ G
∗, G∗ 6ρdf⊥
(p,⊥c, p).
In summary, we have the following situation:
• r(IG∗) = k;
• hcG(p) = k;
• since G∗ 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) and IG∗ is the characteristic model of G
∗, IG∗ 6ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p).
Hence IG∗ ∈ c min(p). This, together with G |=min 〈p, sc, q〉, implies IG∗ ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q).
Being IG∗ the characteristic model of G∗, IG∗ satisfies a triple (s, sc, t) iff (s, sc, t) ∈ Cl(G∗).
Hence IG∗ ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) implies G
∗ ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q).
By Lemma 3.5, we know that to derive a triple of form (A, sc, B) from a graph it is sufficient to
consider only the triples in the same graph with the same form, and in G∗ all such triples are in
Gstr ∪ (Dk \ Dk+1)s, that is, Gstr ∪ (Dp)s. HenceG∗ ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) implies
Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q) ,
which concludes.
✷
The following theorem establishes correctness and completeness of the DefMinEntailmentCprocedure.
Theorem 3.25. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph and let 〈p, sc, q〉 be a defeasible triple.
Then,
G |=min 〈p, sc, q〉 iff DefMinEntailmentC(G, r(G), 〈p, sc, q〉) .
Proof. Let RminG be the minimal model of G, with h(RminG) = n. Given 〈p, sc, q〉 we have two
possible cases:
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Case hcG(p) 6 n. The result is guaranteed by Lemma 3.24.
Case hcG(p) =∞. By Definition 3.4, RminG ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉. At the same time, if h
c
G(p) = ∞, then
by definition of the procedure, DefMinEntailmentC(G, r(G), 〈p, sc, q〉) must be the case.
✷
Eventually, an analogous procedure to DefMinEntailmentC can be defined for the case of defeasible
triples of the form 〈p, sp, q〉, as illustrated by the DefMinEntailmentP procedure.
Procedure DefMinEntailmentP(G, r(G), 〈p, sp, q〉)
Input: GraphG = Gstr ∪Gdef , ranking r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞}, defeasible triple 〈p, sp, q〉
Output: true iff G |=min 〈p, sp, q〉
1: i :=0
2: Dn+1 :=D∞
3: repeat
4: if i 6 n then
5: G′ :=Gstr ∪ (Di)s
6: j :=i
7: i :=i+ 1
8: else
9: return true
10: until G′ 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p)
11: Dp :={〈r, sp, s〉 | 〈r, sp, s〉 ∈ Dj \ Dj+1}
12: return Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sp, q)
The proof that procedureDefMinEntailmentP is correct and complete w.r.t. |=min proceeds similarly
to the one for DefMinEntailmentC.
Specifically, we first prove the analogous of Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.26. Let T be a ρdf⊥ proof tree from H to (p, sp, q). Then T contains only triples of the form
(A, sp, B).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.5, we just need to refer to rule (2a) instead of (3a).
✷
Also for the other propositions the proof is analogous to the correspondent propositions for the one for
procedure DefMinEntailmentC. It suffices to change every instance of sc with sp, ⊥c with ⊥p, every
reference to Lemma 3.5 with Lemma 3.26, and so on. Specifically, we have
Lemma 3.27. Let T be a proof tree from a graph H to a triple (p, sp, q), and let I be a model of H . If
I ρdf⊥ (s,⊥p, s) for some triple (s, sp, o) ∈ H , then I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥p, p).
Lemma 3.28. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph, and let r(G) = {D0, . . . , Dn, D∞} be its
ranking. For any pair of terms p, q s.t. hpG(p) 6 n,
G |=min 〈p, sp, q〉 iff G
str ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sp, q) ,
where Dp is defined as in the DefMinEntailmentP procedure.
Eventually, we conclude with the following theorem establishing correctness and completeness of the
DefMinEntailmentP procedure.
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Theorem 3.29. Let G = Gstr ∪ Gdef be a defeasible graph and let 〈p, sp, q〉 be a defeasible triple.
Then,
G |=min 〈p, sp, q〉 iff DefMinEntailmentP(G, r(G), 〈p, sp, q〉) .
We conclude this section with some examples.
Example 3.3. Consider the graph H , similar to the graph F from Example 3.2, but with the following
changes:
• the triple 〈b, sc, hf〉 has been added, where hf is read as ‘having feathers’;
• The information that penguins do not fly has been made defeasible, that is, the triple (p, sc, e) has
been substituted by 〈p, sc, e〉;
• the triple 〈pj, sc, f〉 has been added, where pj is read as ‘penguins with jet-packs’.
That is, H = Hstr ∪Hdef , with
Hstr = {(p, sc, b), (r, sc, b), (e,⊥c, f)} ,
Hdef = {〈b, sc, f〉, 〈p, sc, e〉, 〈b, sc, hf〉, 〈pj, sc, f〉} .
GivenHs = {(p, sc, b), (r, sc, b), (b, sc, f), (p, sc, e), (e,⊥c, f), (b, sc, hf), (pj, sc, f)}, it is easy to check
that:
• Hs 6⊢ρdf⊥ (b,⊥c, b);
• Hs 6⊢ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, r);
• Hs ⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p);
• Hs ⊢ρdf⊥ (pj,⊥c, pj).
That is, by procedure Ranking(H),
D1 = {〈p, sc, e〉, 〈pj, sc, f〉} .
Since
• Hstr ∪ D1s 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p), and
• Hstr ∪ D1s ⊢ρdf⊥ (pj,⊥c, pj),
the procedure Ranking(H) gives back
D2 = {〈pj, sc, f〉} ,
and terminates with
D∞ = ∅ ,
as Hstr ∪ D2
s 6⊢ρdf⊥ (pj,⊥c, pj).
Given Ranking(H), we can start checking what is minimally entailed. First of all, we can check that
penguins do not fly, that is, we can make the following queries:
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Triple 〈p, sc, e〉. We apply the procedure DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈p, sc, e〉) and have:
G′ 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) for i = 1, that implies D
p = {〈p, sc, e〉}.
Gstr∪(Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, e), since (D
p)s = {(p, sc, e)}, and DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈p, sc, e〉)
returns true.
Triple 〈p, sc, f〉. We apply the procedure DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈p, sc, f〉) and have:
Gstr ∪ (Dp)s 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, f), and DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈p, sc, f〉) returns false.
The procedure DefMinEntailmentCallows us to correctly derive that penguins do not fly, while it avoids
to derive that penguins fly. What about the other typical property of birds in our graph, that is, having
feathers?
Triple 〈p, sc, hf〉. We apply the procedure DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈p, sc, hf〉) and have:
Gstr ∪ (Dp)s 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, hf), and DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈p, sc, hf〉) returns false.
This latter example shows a well-known behaviour of RC: in the case a class is exceptional w.r.t. a super-
class, it does not inherit any of the typical properties of the super-class. In this specific case, since
penguins are exceptional birds (they do not fly), in RC they do not inherit any of the typical properties of
birds: we cannot conclude that penguins have feathers. This behaviour, called the drowning effect [15],
may not be desirable in some applications. Let us recall that various RC extensions have been developed
to overcome the drowning effect [57, 28, 26, 23, 48].
Now we move to check the behaviour of sub-classes that do not show any exceptional behaviour. From
our graph we know that robins are birds, and we have no information about any unusual property asso-
ciated to robins. As a consequence, reasoning on the base of the principle of ‘presumption of typicality’
(see Section 3.2), we would like robins to inherit all the typical properties of birds. In fact, we have:
Triple 〈r, sc, f〉. We apply the procedure DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈b, sc, f〉) and get:
G′ 6⊢ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, r) for i = 0, that implies D
p = {〈b, sc, f〉, 〈b, sc, hf〉}.
Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (r, sc, f), since (b, sc, f) ∈ (D
p)s and (r, sc, b) ∈ Gstr , it follows that
DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈r, sc, f〉) returns true.
Triple 〈r, sc, hf〉. We apply the procedure DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈b, sc, hf〉) and get:
G′ 6⊢ρdf⊥ (r,⊥c, r) for i = 0.
Gstr ∪ (Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (r, sc, hf), since (b, sc, hf) ∈ (D
p)s and (r, sc, b) ∈ Gstr, it follows that
DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈r, sc, hf〉) returns true.
Eventually, we check what happens with an extra level of exceptionaly. Do penguins with jet-packs fly or
not?
Triple 〈pj, sc, f〉. We apply the procedure DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈pj, sc, f〉) and have:
G′ 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) for i = 2, that implies D
p = {〈pj, sc, f〉}.
Gstr∪(Dp)s ⊢ρdf⊥ (pj, sc, f), since (D
p)s = {(pj, sc, f)}, and DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈pj, scf〉)
returns true.
Triple 〈p, sc, e〉. We apply the procedure DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈pj, sc, e〉) and have:
Gstr ∪ (Dp)s 6⊢ρdf⊥ (p, sc, e), and DefMinEntailmentC(H, r(H), 〈p, sc, e〉) returns false.
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Therefore, correctly RC does not allow penguins with jet-packs to inherit the property of not-flying from
typical penguins.
✷
The next example shows a case in which we have some information with infinite rank, and how that
indicates the presence of some conflict.
Example 3.4. Let the graph L contain the following information
L = {(b, sc, ba), (mb, sc, b), (ba,⊥c, bw)〈mb, sc, bw〉} ,
where ba is read ‘breaths air’, bw is read ‘breaths underwater’, and mb is the class ‘marsh bird’.
When we apply the procedure Ranking(L), as
Ls ⊢ρdf⊥ (mb,⊥c,mb)
we obtain D0 = D1 = D∞ = {〈mb, sc, bw〉}. We can check, using the procedure StrictMinEntailment,
that L minimally entails (mb,⊥c,mb): since 〈mb, sc, bw〉 ∈ D∞, we have (mb,⊥c,mb) ∈ L′, that
obviously imples
L′ ⊢ρdf⊥ (mb,⊥c,mb) .
That is, StrictMinEntailment(L, r(L), (mb,⊥c,mb)) returns true.
The outcomes in Example 3.4 are reasonable and desirable: despite we are dealing with defeasible infor-
mation, we are facing an unsolvable conflict: we are informed that birds breath air, (b, sc, ba), without
exceptions, since it is a strict ρdf⊥-triple, while marsh birds usually breath underwater, 〈mb, sc, bw〉. The
triple (b, sc, ba), not being defeasible, does not allow the existence of birds breathing underwater, and
from the information at our disposal it is reasonable to conclude that marsh birds cannot exist, that is,
(mb,⊥c,mb).
Triples with infinite rank appear when there is some unsolvable conflict in the graph. Another example
comes when we have in the graph pieces of information that are in direct conflict with each other. For
example, if we add to the graph H in Example 3.3 the two defeasible triples 〈mb, sc, f〉, 〈mb, sc, e〉
(‘marsch birds typically fly’ and ‘marsh birds typically do not fly’), that are in direct conflict with each
other, we end up again with (mb,⊥c,mb).
3.6 Structural properties
RC, like many other non-monotonic approaches, has also bee analysed from a ‘structural properties’ point
of view [60]. For example, in the propositional case, given a knowledge baseK of defeasible conditionals
α β (read ‘if α holds, typically β holds too’), where α and β are propositions, RC satisfies a particular
form of constrained monotonicity, called Rational Monotonicity (RM) [58]:
(RM)
K|=α β, K6|=α ¬γ
K|=α∧γ β
.
The intended meaning of an instance of the structural property above is the following: if I know that
typical birds fly (K |= α  β), and I am not aware that typical birds are not black (K 6|= α  ¬γ), then
I may conclude that, typically, black birds fly (K |= α ∧ γ  β).
In our framework, a propositional defeasible conditional α  β correspond to defeasible triples of
the form 〈p, sc, q〉 and 〈p, sp, q〉. Therefore, given a graphG, the property (RM) may take a form like
(RM)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,q〉, G 6ρdf⊥〈p,sc,¬r〉
Gρdf⊥〈p∧r,sc,q〉
.
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Such a property is linked to the use of conjunction and negation of terms, which, however, are not sup-
ported (so far) in ρdf⊥. It does not seem possible to express (RM) in defeasible ρdf⊥.
However, there are a few basic structural properties that still can be expressed in our framework. One
of the simplest one is the property of Supraclassicality, as it is called in the propositional setting, that
simply indicates that a strict piece of information implies also its own defeasible, weaker formulation,
that is,
(Suprac)
Gρdf⊥(p,sc,q)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,q〉
, (Suprap)
Gρdf⊥(p,sp,q)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sp,q〉
Proposition 3.30. ρdf⊥ satisfies (Suprac) and (Suprap).
Proof. Consider (Suprac), and let G ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q). That implies that all ρdf⊥-interpretations in the
minimal modelRminG satisfy (p, sc, q). Consequently, for every ρdf⊥-interpretationI in c min(p,RminG),
I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q). That is, according to Definition 3.4, RminG ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉, that is to G ρdf⊥
〈p, sc, q〉. The proof (Suprap) is analogous. ✷
Reflexivity, Left Logical Equivalence, and Right Weakening are other essential properties. In the proposi-
tional case they are:
(Ref) K |= α α,
(LLE)
K|=α β, |=α≡γ
K|=γ β
, (RW )
K|=α β, β|=γ
K|=α γ
,
As for Supraclassicality, these properties can also be translated in our system in two versions: one for
classes and in one for predicates. For (LLE), logical equivalence ‘≡’ is translated using symmetric pairs
of sc- and sp-triples. Specifically, the above axioms are encoded as
(Refc) G ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, p〉,
(LLEc)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,r〉, Gρdf⊥(p,sc,q), Gρdf⊥(q,sc,p)
Gρdf⊥〈q,sc,r〉
, (RWc)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,q〉, Gρdf⊥(q,sc,r)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,r〉
,
(Refp) G ρdf⊥ 〈p, sp, p〉,
(LLEp)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sp,r〉, Gρdf⊥(p,sp,q), Gρdf⊥(q,sp,p)
Gρdf⊥〈q,sp,r〉
, (RWp)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sp,q〉, Gρdf⊥(q,sp,r)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sp,r〉
,
Note that (Refc) and (Refp) do not hold, as they do not hold in the classical form G ρdf⊥ (p, sc, p)
and G ρdf⊥ (p, sp, p). This is the consequence of having considered minimal ρdf for which reflexivity
for sc and sp triples does not hold. If we use classical ρdf, we will recover reflexivity for the classical
triples, and, by Proposition 3.30, we would obtain immediately also (Refc) and (Refp).
Concerning (LLE) and (RW ), they are satisfied.
Proposition 3.31. ρdf⊥ satisfies (LLEc), (RWc), (LLEp), and (RWp).
Proof. We prove (LLEc) and (RWc). The proofs for (LLEp) and (RWi) are analogous.
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(LLEc). Let G ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q), G ρdf⊥ (q, sc, p),and G ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, r〉. G ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q)
and G ρdf⊥ (q, sc, p) imply that every ρdf⊥-intepretation in RminG satisfies (p, sc, q) and
(q, sc, p). Since the semantics is sound w.r.t. the derivation rules, by rule (5b) we have that for
every ρdf⊥-intepretation I in RminG, I ρdf⊥ (p,⊥c, p) iff I ρdf⊥ (q,⊥c, q). Consequently
c min(p,RminG) = c min(q,RminG).
Let I be in c min(p,RminG). SinceG ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, r〉, I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, r). We also have I ρdf⊥
(q, sc, p), and, being I soundw.r.t. rule (3a), we conclude I ρdf⊥ (q, sc, r). c min(p,RminG) =
c min(q,RminG) impliesRminG ρdf⊥ 〈q, sc, r〉, that is, G ρdf⊥ 〈q, sc, r〉.
(RWc). G ρdf⊥ (q, sc, r) implies that every ρdf⊥-intepretation in RminG satisfies (q, sc, r). Let I be
in c min(p,RminG). Since G ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, q〉, I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, q). Hence I ρdf⊥ (p, sc, r), that
impliesRminG ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, r〉, that is, G ρdf⊥ 〈p, sc, r〉.
✷
Remark 3.4. Let us note that, despite (RM) seems not to be syntactically expressible in our framework,
we have proposed the same kind of construction that is behind propositional RC, that is, we model a kind
of defeasible reasoning implementing the Presumption of Typicality [59, p.4]: ‘if we are not informed of
the contrary, we reason assuming that we are dealing with typical behaviours. From a semantics point
of view, this “maximisation of typicality” has been modelled considering the minimal models of a KB:
those models in which the entities are associated to the lowest (i.e., most typical) possible rank value,
modulo the satisfaction of the knowledge base. This formal solution has been used also elsewhere in
order to give a semantic characterisation of RC [21, 49, 42, 68]. On the other hand, from the decision
procedure point of view, we have defined a procedure that follows similar methods developed for RC in
other formal frameworks; in particular, our decision procedure is built on top of the decision procedure
for the monotonic fragment, and decides RC through a calculation of exceptionalities and rank values, as
it is done e.g., for RC in the propositional and description logic frameworks [25, 30, 37].
Nevertheless, there are some more properties satisfied by our entailment relation |=min. In the following,
let us consider the closure operation Cl|=min defined as follows: given a graphG,
Cl|=min(G) := {Js, p, oK | G |=min Js, p, oK}.
As we may expect, Cl|=min is not monotonic, that is, given any graphG and triple Js, p, oK, the following
does not necessarily hold:
Cl|=min(G) ⊆ Cl|=min(G ∪ {Js, p, oK})
Proposition 3.32. Cl|=min is not monotonic.
Proof. Consider the graphG in Example 3.1, and its subgraph
G′ = {(p, sc, b), 〈b, sc, f〉, (e,⊥c, f)} ,
obtained eliminating the triple (p, sc, e).
Then it can be shown that w.r.t.G′ penguins are not exceptional, i.e.,
DefMinEntailmentP(G′, r(G′), 〈p, sc, f〉) = true ,
while w.r.t. G penguins are exceptional, i.e.,
DefMinEntailmentP(G, r(G), 〈p, sc, f〉) = false .
✷
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Nonetheless, and not surprising, Cl|=min(G) is monotonic w.r.t. the strict part of the information.
Proposition 3.33. Let G be any graph, (s, p, o) any ρdf⊥-triple, and Js
′, p′, o′K be any triple. If G |=min
(s, p, o), then G ∪ {Js′, p′, o′K} |=min (s, p, o).
Proof. This is immediate from Theorem 3.22. Indeed, G |=min (s, p, o) implies G′ ⊢ρdf⊥ (s, p, o), with
G′ defined according to the procedure StrictMinEntailment. Let F := G ∪ {Js′, p′, o′K}, and let F ′
be defined applying the procedure StrictMinEntailment to F . ClearlyG′ ⊆ F ′, and, given that ⊢ρdf⊥
is monotonic, we can conclude F ′ ⊢ρdf⊥ (s, p, o), that is, F |=min (s, p, o). ✷
This is clearly a desirable behaviour, since the strict part of our information should be treated as non-
defeasible information, and consequently we should reason monotonically about it.
Cl|=min satisfies some other desirable properties: namely, Inclusion, Cumulativity, and Idempotence.
Proposition 3.34. Cl|=min satisfies inclusion. That is, for any graphG
G ⊆ Cl|=min(G).
Proof. Cl|=min(G) is determined by the modelRminG, and, by definition,RminG ∈ RG, that is, RminG
is a model of G, implyingG ⊆ Cl|=min(G). ✷
Proposition 3.35. Cl|=min satisfies Cumulativity. That is, for any pair of graphsG,G
′,
If G ⊆ G′ ⊆ Cl|=min(G), then Cl|=min(G
′) = Cl|=min(G).
Proof. Cl|=min(G) is determined by the model RminG, that is, the minimal model of G. Since G
′ ⊆
Cl|=min(G), RminG is also a model of G
′. Therefore, RminG must be the minimal model also for G′.
Indeed, assume that is not the case, that is, there is a modelR ofG′ such thatR  RminG. SinceG ⊆ G′,
R is also a model ofG, andRminG would not be the minimal model ofG, against the hypothesis. Hence
both Cl|=min(G) and Cl|=min(G
′) are determined by the modelRminG. ✷
Cumulativity has two immediate consequence that are well-known, desirable properties: a constrained
form of monotonicity, called Cautious Monotonicity, and the classical property of Cut.
Proposition 3.36. Cl|=min satisfies Cautious Monotonicity. That is, for any graph G and any triple
Js, p, oK,
If G |=min Js, p, oK and G |=min Js
′, p′, o′K, then G ∪ Js′, p′, o′K |=min Js, p, oK.
Proposition 3.37. Cl|=min satisfies Cut. That is, for any graphG and any triple Js, p, oK,
If G ∪ Js′, p′, o′K |=min Js, p, oK andG |=min Js
′, p′, o′K, thenG |=min Js, p, oK.
Please note that these two properties are here analysed at the level of entailment. As discussed above, in
the case of the conditional reasoning [58] these structural properties can be expressed at two levels: at
the level of conditionals (see the first formulation of (RM) above), and the meta-level of the entailment
relation. Here we are looking at the properties (CM) and (Cut) at the meta-level of the entailment relation.
Similarly to the (RM) case, such properties at the level of the language may be expressed as
(CM)
Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,q〉, Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,r〉
Gρdf⊥〈p∧r,sc,q〉
, (Cut)
Gρdf⊥〈p∧r,sc,q〉, Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,r〉
Gρdf⊥〈p,sc,q〉
,
if conjunction among terms would have been allowed.
Eventually, Cl|=min satisfies also Idempotence, that is, Cl|=min is actually a closure operation.
Proposition 3.38. Cl|=min satisfies Idempotence. That is, for any graphG,
Cl|=min(Cl|=min(G)) = Cl|=min(G) .
Proof. Idempotence is an immediate consequence of Inclusion and Cumulativity. It is sufficient to set
G′ = Cl|=min(G) in the Cumulativity property, while Inclusion guarantees thatG ⊆ Cl|=min(G) holds. ✷
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3.7 Computational complexity
We now shortly address the computational complexity of the previously defined procedures and show that
our entailment decision procedures run in polynomial time.
To start with, let us consider ⊢ρdf⊥ . Now, consider a graphG and a ρdf⊥-triple (s, p, q). An easy way
to decide whether G ⊢ρdf⊥ (s, p, q) holds is to compute the closure Cl(G) of G and then check whether
(s, p, q) ∈ Cl(G). Now, as G is ground, like for [63, Theorem 19], it is easily verified that, the size of the
closure of G is O(|G|2) and, thus,
Proposition 3.39. For a graph G and a ρdf⊥-triple (s, p, q), G ⊢ρdf⊥ (s, p, q) can be decided in time
O(|G|2).
Remark 3.5. Let us note that [63, Theorem 21] provides also an O(|G| log |G|) time algorithm to de-
cide the ground ρdf entailment problem.10 Whether a similar algorithm can be extended also to ρdf⊥
(so including also rules (5)-(7)) while maintaining the same computational complexity is still an open
problem.
We next consider the ExceptionalC and ExceptionalP procedures. It is immediately verified that, by
Proposition 3.5,
Proposition 3.40. For a defeasible graphG = Gstr∪Gdef , both ExceptionalC(G) and ExceptionalP(G)
require at most |Gdef | ⊢ρdf⊥ checks and, thus, both run in time O(|G
def ||G|2).
Consider now the case of the Ranking procedure. It is easily verified that steps 3.-6. may be repeated
at most |Gdef | times and each of which calls once the ExceptionalC and ExceptionalP procedures.
Therefore, by Proposition 3.40, we have easily that
Proposition 3.41. For a defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef , Ranking(G) runs in time O(|Gdef |2|G|2).
Moreover, the number of sets in r(G) is at most O(|Gdef |).
Eventually, let us consider the entailment check procedures in Section 3.5. Let us recall Remark 3.3 and,
thus, we assume that the ranking has been computed once for all. The time required to compute r(G) is,
by Proposition 3.41, O(|Gdef |2|G|2).
To what concerns StrictMinEntailment, the following result is an immediate fromProposition 3.39.
Proposition 3.42. Consider a defeasible graph G = Gstr ∪ Gdef and a ρdf⊥-triple (s, p, o). Then the
procedure StrictMinEntailment(G, r(G), (s, p, o)) runs in time O(|G|2).
Now, consider DefMinEntailmentC. By Proposition 3.41, it is easily verified that the steps 3.-10. may
be repeated at most O(|Gdef |) times and each time we make one ⊢ρdf⊥ check. By considering also the
additional ⊢ρdf⊥ check in step 12, by Proposition 3.39 we have
Proposition 3.43. Consider a defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef and a defeasible triple 〈p, sc, q〉. Then
the procedure DefMinEntailmentC(G, r(G), 〈p, sc, q〉)) runs in time O(|Gdef ||G|2).
The computational complexity of DefMinEntailmentP is the same as for DefMinEntailmentC and,
thus, we conclude with
Proposition 3.44. Consider a defeasible graphG = Gstr ∪Gdef and a defeasible triple 〈p, sp, q〉. Then
the procedure DefMinEntailmentP(G, r(G), 〈p, sc, q〉)) runs in time O(|Gdef ||G|2).
10It corresponds here to consider rules (1)-(4).
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4 Brief Conclusions & Related Work
Contribution. We have shown how onemay integrate RC within RDFS and, thus, obtain a non-monotone
variant of the latter. To to do so, we started from ρdf, which is the logic behind RDFS, and then extended
it to ρdf⊥, allowing to state that two entities are incompatible. Eventually, we have worked out defeasible
ρdf⊥ via a typical RC construction.
The main features of our approach are summarised as follows:
• unlike other approaches that typically add an extra non-monotone rule layer on top of monotone
RDFS (see below), defeasible ρdf⊥ remains syntactically a triple language and is a simple vocabu-
lary extension of ρdf by introducing some new predicate symbols, namely⊥c and⊥p, with specific
semantics allowing to state that two terms are incompatible. In particular, any RDFS reasoner/store
may handle them as ordinary terms if it does not want to take account for the extra semantics of the
new predicate symbols;
• the defeasible ρdf⊥ entailment decision procedure is build on top of the ρdf⊥ entailment decision
procedure, which in turn is an extension of the one for ρdf via some additional inference rules
favouring an potential implementation;
• we have shown that defeasible ρdf⊥ entailment can be decided in polynomial time.
We have also analysed our proposal from a ‘structural properties’ point of view, describing which prop-
erties can be expressed in our proposal (not all can be expressed as Boolean connectives are missing in
RDFS).
Related Work. There have been various works in the past about extending RDF/S with non-monotone
capabilities, which we briefly summarise below.
The series of works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 31] essentially deal with Extended RDFS (ERDF), which
consists in extending RDFS with two negations of Partial Logic [51], namely weak negation∼ (express-
ing negation-as-failure or non-truth) and strong negation ¬ (expressing explicit negative information or
falsity), as well as derivation rules. The semantics is based on some form of stable model semantics. So
for instance, one may express the weak negation of a triple (s, p, o) as ∼ p(s, o), while its strong nega-
tion as ¬p(s, o) and use them in rules, such as ¬type(x,EUMember)← type(x,AmericanCountry).
Clearly, none of them can be represented in RDFS and there is also a computational complexity price to
pay for, as illustrated in [7] (e.g.,. deciding model existence goes from NP to PSPACE, depending on the
setting).
On a similar line, i.e., using rule languages on top of RDFS, and borrowing non-monotone semantics
developed within rules languages, are also all other approaches we are aware of, such as [8, 11, 12, 14,
16, 17, 18, 54, 55, 65] and practical large scale solutions such as [9, 10, 53, 73, 72, 77, 78]. Let us also
note that there are more general solutions in providing a rule layer on top of ontology languages such as
RDFS and OWL, which can be found in e.g., [32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
Eventually, we refer to the related work section in [30] for a recent recap about works, such as
e.g., [22, 23, 27, 24, 25, 26, 29, 38, 40, 41, 42, 46, 45, 43, 44, 47, 20, 74, 70, 69, 71], about RC extension
of DLs, the logic behind OWL 2 [66].
Future Work. Concerning future work, there are still some extension that are worth to be addressed
within our framework. Two directions appear particularly promising: on one hand, as shown in Example
3.3, RC suffers of the drowing effect, and we would like to reformulate in the present framework some
constructions defined for DL, such as [29, 26], that extend RC and overcome the drowning effect; on
the other hand, we would like to extend defeasible triples also to other predicates of the ρdf vocabulary
beyond sc and sp.
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Another point deals with the computational complexity of our framework. In particular, we would
like to see whether an approach similar as described in [63] can be applied to our context as well (see
Remark 3.5).
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